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    “At the end of the day negative interest rates 
are taxes in sheep’s clothing” 
         Christopher J. Waller (2016) 
 
 
“For Japan in particular, the impact of the 
negative interest rate policy on the profits of 
financial institutions tends to be relatively large” 
Haruhiko Kuroda (2016) 
 
 
“Net interest income has remained quite stable… for 
some banks however the negative effect of negative 
interest rates can be larger than for others.” 
Mario Draghi (2017) 
 
 
“The MPC is very clear that ‘lower bound’ is a positive 
number…I am not a fan of negative rates. We see the 
negative consequences through the financial system in 
other jurisdictions” 
Mark Carney (2016) 
 
 
“A decrease in the real interest rate to -3 or even -4 
percent will make little or no difference, perhaps […] 
exposing the economy to greater financial instability.”  
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Joseph Stiglitz (2016) 
 
“The amount of extra stimulus generated by this further 
reduction of rates (due to negative rates) would not have 
been negligible by any means… but neither would it 
likely have been a game-changer.” 
Ben Bernanke (2016) 
 
 
“Zero or negative rates undermine, when they become 
quasi-permanent, the efficient allocation of capital and 
set the stage for bubbles, bust and crises.” 
Kemal Dervis (2016) 
 
 
“Far from encouraging lending and spending, negative 
interest rate at the central bank might work in the 
opposite direction.” 
William White (2014) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this doctoral thesis is to study the recent use of negative interest rates focusing on 
the impact that the negative interest rate policy (NIRP thereafter) has on bank profitability, 
lending and sovereign bond holding. After providing a definition and contextualisation of 
NIRP, this thesis addresses three different research questions.  
The first research question will focus on the impact of NIRP on bank profitability and 
consequently on financial stability. A cut in interest rates into negative territory may increase 
bank profitability if there is significant loan growth and margins are unaffected, or/and if banks 
boost fee and commission income on the back of greater lending. However, if banks are unable 
to reduce deposit rates to the same extent as loan rates then margins will be compressed, and if 
there is limited loan growth and/or cross-selling of fee and commission services then profits 
will likely fall. If the latter is the case, the decline in profits can erode bank capital bases and 
further limit credit growth thus stifling NIRP monetary transmission effects. The first paper 
addresses this serious concern. It examines whether or not, after the introduction of NIRP, 
banks margins and profits have been negatively affected. Furthermore, it investigates if 
negative rates have promoted a change in bank business model. The contraction of net interest 
margin could have affected banks business model promoting a switch from interest-based to 
fee-based activities. 
The second paper is strongly linked to the first. If NIRP decreases banks profitability eroding 
capital base, banks may be reluctant to lend limiting monetary policy potential and expected 
outcome. The second research question addresses this point. It tries to capture whether or not 
after the implementation of NIRP banks increased or decreased lending in comparison with a 
control group who has not been affected by negative rates. The effect of NIRP on bank lending 
may further be aggravated in the European context where banks have been facing slow 
economic recovery, historically high levels of non-performing loans, and a post GFC and 
European sovereign debt crisis deleveraging phase. In this economic environment, banks could 
have employed the excess liquidity provided by central banks unconventional monetary policy 
measures to buy corporate and government debt securities rather than lending. This behaviour 
links to the third research question.  
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The third research question investigates banks sovereign bond holding during the low and 
negative interest rate environment that has characterised the period after the 2007/2008 
Financial Crisis and European Sovereign Debt Crisis. In such a situation, banks may prefer to 
hold sovereign bonds rather than lending for the following reasons. First, prudential regulation 
favours sovereign debt over loans as it assigns neither capital charges (zero-risk-weights) nor 
portfolio concentration limits. Banks with low capital ratio may increase return on equity by 
shifting from low to high yield sovereigns without altering regulatory capital requirements. 
Second, in a period with slow economic recovery, historically high level of non-performing 
loans, increasing loan loss provisions and low interest rates, sovereign debt can act as a 
substitute for credit affecting banks’ lending decision. The same reasons, as previously 
described, can negatively affect bank profitability suggesting that banks may have an incentive 
to purchase high yield sovereign debt securities to improve profitability conditions (carry trade 
hypothesis).  
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CHAPTER 1:  
A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE NEGATIVE INTEREST RATE POLICY 
 
1.1  Transmission Channels and Transmission Problems of Negative Interest Rates 
NIRP operates essentially in the same way as a positive interest rate cut. It works through six 
main channels: the interest rate channel, the lending channel, the asset valuation/balance sheet 
channel, the portfolio rebalancing/risk-taking channel, the exchange rate channel and the 
reflation channel1. 
 
1.1.1 The Interest Rate channel 
The interest rate channel of monetary policy suggests that accommodative monetary policies 
reduce interest rates. This reduction lowers borrowers funding costs, raising investments2 and 
aggregate demand (as illustrated below). 
𝑀 ↑ ⇉  𝑖𝑟 ↓ ⇉ 𝐼 ↑ ⇉ 𝐴𝐷 ↑ 3 
An important feature of the interest rate channel is its emphasis on the real (𝑖𝑟) rather than 
nominal interest rate (sticky prices hypothesis). Specifically, the long-term real interest rate has 
major impact on investors’ decisions. Focusing on real interest rates, central banks can provide 
stimulus even when monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound (ZBL). 
Accommodative monetary policies raises future inflation expectations (𝜋𝑒), thereby lowering 
real interest rates (as shown in the Fisher equation below):  
r = i - 𝜋𝑒  
By targeting inflation expectations, central banks can use the interest rate channel to support 
investment and economic growth.  
M↑⇉ 𝜋𝑒↑⇉ 𝑖𝑟↓⇉ I↑ ⇉ AD↑ 
As conventional monetary policy tools, NIRP is assumed to lower short-term money market 
and bond rates (Hannoun, 2015; Jackson, 2015; Jobst and Lin, 2016; Arteta et al. 2016). As 
                                                          
1 See  Mishkin (1995) for an overview of the transmission channels of monetary policy.  
2 Business and consumer investment decisions are included in this category.  
3 M↑ and M↓ refer to lessening and tightening monetary policies, respectively. 
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positive, negative rates can also lower long-term rates by acting on both investors’ arbitrage 
differences in risk-adjusted expect returns and maturities of debt securities. As a result, deposit 
and lending rates decline improving borrowers funding costs (banks) and budget constrain 
(households and firms). This effect should encourage economic agents to increase investment 
and consumption.  
As shown by figure 1 and 2, the introduction of negative rates (red vertical line in the graphs) 
contributed to a further reduction in lending as well as deposit rates.  
Figure 1. European Lending Rates over the Period 2010-2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
3
4
5
6
%
2010m6 2011m6 2012m6 2013m6 2014m6 2015m5 2016m6 2017m6
mdate
lendingrate_newbusiness lendingrate_consumption
lendingrate_houses
Author's Calculation
ECB data
2010-2017
Europe lending rates
10 
 
Figure 2. European Deposit Rates over the Period 2010-2017. 
 
The interest rate channel can be distorted when rates are cut into negative territory. Commercial 
banks, in fact, might be reluctant to impose negative rates to costumer fearing to lose the 
deposits base. Hence, deposit rates (funding cost for banks) can be less affected by the policy 
(downward stickiness). This tendency, combined with efforts to maintain net interest margin, 
could potentially reduce the pass-through to lending rates as well. 
 
1.1.2 The Credit Channel 
The credit channel of monetary policy (see Bernanke and Gertler (1995)) is based on two 
different specific channels: the lending channel and the balance sheet channel.  
 
The Lending Channel 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) pointed out the existence of a 
lending channel of monetary policy transmission. The latter is based on the assumption that 
banks play a well-suited role in solving asymmetric information issues in the credit market. 
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Expansionary monetary policies lead to an increase in banks reserves and deposits, which 
ultimately can lead to an increase in lending and aggregate demand.  
M ↑⇉ bank deposits ↑⇉ bank loans↑⇉ I ↑⇉ AD↑ 
NIRP effectively acts as a tax on excess reserves (Hannoun, 2015; Arteta el al. 2016). Banks 
face an opportunity-cost of holding excess reserves at the account of the central banks. 
Therefore, NIRP encourages banks to use them to increase lending.  
However, a cut in interest rates into negative territory may increase bank profitability if there 
is significant loan growth and margins are unaffected, or/and if banks boost fee and commission 
income on the back of greater lending. Nevertheless, if banks are unable to reduce deposit rates 
to the same extent as loan rates then margins will be compressed, and if there is limited loan 
growth and/or cross-selling of fee and commission services then profits will likely fall. If the 
latter is the case, the decline in profits can erode bank capital bases and further limit credit 
growth thus stifling NIRP monetary transmission effects. 
 
Balance Sheet Channel  
Monetary policy can affect the balance sheet channel in several ways. A first channel is through 
firms’ cash flow. Expansionary monetary policies reduce nominal interest rate4, which in turn 
improve firm cash flow (less interest expenses).  
M↑⇉ i↓⇉ cash flow↑⇉ I↑⇉ AD↑ 
This situation is also particularly suitable for banks in term of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Low firm net worth requires high screening and monitoring costs for banks (adverse 
selection). Furthermore, borrowers with lower net worth have smaller equity stake in the 
company. Hence, they might engage in riskier projects (moral hazard). Riskier projects raise 
the likelihood that the lenders will not be paid back. This can lead to high non-performing loans 
in the banks’ portfolio that can ultimately limit banks’ willingness and ability to lend reducing 
investment and aggregate demand.  
M↓⇉ i↑⇉ cash flow↓⇉ Moral Hazard↑⇉ Adverse Selection↑⇉ NPLs↑⇉ Lending↓⇉ I ↓ ⇉ 
AD↓ 
                                                          
4 In this situation, the nominal level of interest rate is more important. Nominal interest rates play a crucial role as 
short-term rather than long-term interest rates have stronger impact on firms’ cash flow (Mishkin, 1995). 
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The aforementioned effect links also to the mechanism described by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
regarding credit rationing. Riskier borrowers are the ones that are willing to pay high interest 
rates because the benefits they received if the investment pays off are much higher than the 
losses if the project is unsuccessful. Therefore, bank denied loans to investors when interest 
rate is high suspecting moral hazard behaviour. Accommodative monetary policy reduces this 
moral hazard problem as less risky borrowers should be the highest fraction of borrowers, 
hence leading banks to increase loans.  
Finally, unexpected monetary policy easing has positive effect on prices. This lowers the value 
of firms’ liabilities in real term (reduced debt burden) as debt contract are usually fixed in 
nominal terms. For the aforementioned described mechanisms, higher prices increase net 
worth, which can reduces asymmetric information raising investments and aggregate demand.  
M↑⇉ unanticipated P↑⇉Adverse Selection↓⇉Moral Hazard ↓⇉ Lending↑⇉ I↑⇉ AD↑ 
 
1.1.3 Asset Valuation 
The asset valuation channel operates through a price and a wealth effect.  
Price. Low interest rates boost assets prices by reducing the discount rate on cash flow from 
assets (Hannoun, 2015). Tobin’s Q theory (see Tobin, 1969) presented a mechanism through 
which monetary policy affects equity prices. According to the monetarists, accommodative 
monetary policies leave economic agents with excess money holding. Among the other 
alternatives, individuals can allocate excess liquidity increasing the demand for stocks and 
consequently their prices (search for yield). For the Keynesian, this mechanism operates in a 
similar fashion. Lessening monetary policies make bonds less attractive in comparison to 
equities. High equity prices (𝑒𝑝) have an effect on the ratio between the market value of a 
company and the replacement cost of capital (the Tobin’s Q ratio). When the market value of 
a company is high (q is high) respect to the cost of capital, the company can then issue equity 
at higher prices relative to the cost of new plant and equipment they invest.  
M↑⇉ 𝑒𝑝↑⇉ q ↑⇉ I↑⇉ AD↑ 
 
Wealth. The price effect previously mentioned complements the wealth effect. As suggested 
by Modigliani (1971) through the life-cycle model, equity prices have an effect on peoples’ 
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wealth and consequently on consumption. The consumption budget constrain is determined by 
the long-run individuals’ resources, namely human capital, real capital and financial wealth.  
When equity prices increase financial wealth increases and so consumption.  
M↑⇉𝑒𝑝↑⇉ Wealth↑⇉ Consumption↑⇉ AD↑ 
These effects under NIRP could potentially lead to distort asset valuation and lead to risk of 
assets bubbles.  
 
1.1.4 Portfolio Rebalancing Channel or Risk-Taking Channel 
The portfolio rebalancing channel operates similarly to the asset valuation channel. In a low or 
negative interest rates environment, financial intermediaries are motivated to “search for yield” 
(Rajan 2005). Search for yield promotes balance sheet re-composition from safe to risky assets 
and from short-term to long-term asset maturity5. The balance sheet re-composition in turn can 
have beneficial effects for enterprises as well as States. Banks can provide major lending to 
firms and households to keep up profitability (usually low when interest rates are low). They 
can also buy towards long-term government bonds in an attempt to increase yields on the 
security holding. Major loans and long-term securities lead to a further interest rate reduction 
that can stimulate aggregate demand through different monetary transmission channels (mostly 
the interest rate channel) 
M↑⇉ i↓⇉ search for yield↑⇉ lending↑⇉ I↑⇉ AD↑ 
M↑⇉ i↓⇉long-term securities maturity↑⇉ i↓⇉ I↑⇉ AD↑ 
Indeed, according to Hannoun (2015), NIRP seems to have fuelled more risk-taking. The 
convergence between the returns of risky and low-risk assets as currently shown by the 
sovereign spread in the Euro Area is a clear sign in this direction (figure 3). Moreover, 
according to Heider et al. (2016), banks affected by NIRP (deposit-based) started both to lend 
more to riskier borrower in comparison with wholesale-based banks and, at the same time, to 
be perceived as riskier (Nucera et al. 2017). 
 
Figure 3. Ten year government bonds spread (German Bund= benchmark). 
                                                          
5 For an explanation of the risk-taking channel, see Borio and Zu (2008). 
14 
 
 
 
1.1.5 Exchange Rate Channel  
Since the advent of flexible exchange rates and the internationalisation of economies around 
the world, the exchange rate channel has been playing a crucial role for monetary policy 
decisions. Accommodative monetary policies, reducing the level of interest rates, make 
domestic deposits and interest-denominated assets less attractive for investors in comparison 
with foreign currencies. Demand for foreign currencies increases generating an outflow of 
currencies from the country experimenting a reduction in rates to foreign countries. This leads 
to domestic currency depreciation (E↓). When domestic currency depreciates, domestic good 
becomes cheaper than foreign goods, thereby causing a rise in net export (NX↑) and supposedly 
in aggregate output (Y↑).  
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1.1.6 The Reflation Channel 
As suggested by Hannoun (2015), central banks tempt to lift inflation towards the target level 
(generally set at 2%). By using different tools (among which negative rates), policy makers 
ward off the risk of a deflationary spiral which could lead to an increase in debt burden.  
M↑⇉ 𝜋𝑒↑⇉ 𝑖𝑟↓⇉ I↑ ⇉ AD↑ 
Detecting the signs of a downward price spiral are very hard to detect in Europe. 
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1.2 The Implementation of Negative Interest Rates 
 
1.2.1 Euro Area 
In June 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) became one of the first central banks to move 
the deposit facility rate into negative territory – or interest rate paid on excess reserves (IOER) 
– by -0.10 basis points in response to subdued inflation figures. The ECB operated further 
reduction in September 2014 cutting the deposit rate facility by -0.20 basis points, in December 
2015 (-0.30 basis points) and in March 2016 (-0.40 basis points). The main refining operation 
as well as the lending facility followed the reduction of the deposit facility. As shown by figure 
4, money market rates (Eonia and Euribor), always very close to the main refinancing 
operation, entered into negative territory after the introduction of NIRP.  
Figure 4. European Central Bank Policy Rate and Money Market Rates over the period 2010-
2016. 
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The Swedish central bank (Sveriges Riksbank) introduced negative interest rates in July 2014 
to fight against deflationary pressure. The introduction of NIRP was accompanied by different 
unconventional monetary policy measures such as large-scale government debt purchase 
program that led to 800 billion Swedish Krona balance sheet expansion. The Swedish central 
bank does not split commercial bank excess reserves into different tiers in order to manage the 
average interest rate on reserves but rather it conducts daily open market operations to drain 
excess reserves and replaces them with debt securities and other liabilities that have a higher 
yield.  
 
1.2.3 Denmark  
 
The Denmark central bank cut its certificate of deposits into negative territory on 5 September 
2014. The main reason was to reduce financial inflows and upward exchange rate pressure. 
After the introduction of a negative interest rate on certificate of deposits, the interbank rate 
turned negative together with the 1-month Copenhagen Interbank Offered Rate (CIBOR). The 
amount of reserves that commercial banks can hold at the central bank is limited. When 
commercial banks exceed this limit, the excess is converted in certificate of deposits at a 
negative interest rate. This particular system, in which commercial banks can hold a limited 
amount of deposits at the central bank, has been in place before the introduction of NIRP.  
 
1.2.4 Switzerland 
 
As for Denmark, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) implemented negative interest rates on 18th 
December 2014 to relieve pressure to the exchange rate and to maintain the peg with the Euro. 
The SNB lowered all its available policy rates below zero in an effort to avoid excessive 
financial inflows. Being banks behaviour and the possible negative effect of negative interest 
rates on profitability a concern, the SNB adopted a tiered reserve system where NIRP applies 
just for those banks that hold excess reserves above a specific threshold. With this system, 
some banks were able to get wholesale funds at negative rates and place it with the SNB at 
zero. Although the negative interest rate applied by the SNB is the lowest (-75 basis point), the 
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average rate is relatively high when compared to other NIRP-users. This is mostly related to 
the particular tiered reserves system put in place by the SNB.  
 
1.2.5 Norway  
 
Contrarily to the majority of NIRP countries, that introduced NIRP in 2014, Norway adopted 
NIRP in September 2015 in response to concern related to price stability. As Switzerland, the 
Norwegian central bank (Norges Bank) uses a tiered reserves system. However, Norges Bank 
does pay a positive interest rate if commercial banks do not exceed a specific amount of excess 
reserves. It charges excess reserve only if excess reserves exceed a determined quota threshold. 
This has led the interbank overnight rate to remain close to the non-negative policy rate.  
 
1.2.6 Japan  
 
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) adopted NIRP on 29 January 2016. The main aims were providing 
additional monetary policy stimulus and to fight against deflationary spirals. As most of the 
central banks previously described, BoJ implemented a tiered reserve system divided in three 
tiers, each subjected to a different rate of interest. The first is remunerated at a positive rate of 
0.1%. The second tier applies a 0% interest rate. Finally, the tier 3 is subjected to negative 
interest rate of -0.1, The impact of NIRP on profitability has been the major concern of BoJ. 
Net interest margin experienced a severe compression as lending rates strongly declined after 
the NIRP introduction.  
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CHAPTER 2: Bank Margins and Profits in a World of Negative Rates6 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper investigates the influence of negative interest rate policy (NIRP) on bank margins 
and profitability. Using a dataset comprising 7242 banks from 33 OECD member countries 
over 2012-2016 and a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that bank margins and 
profits fell in NIRP-adopter countries compared to countries that did not adopt the policy. The 
results are robust to a variety of checks. This adverse NIRP effect appears to have been stronger 
for banks that were small, operating in competitive system as well as in countries where floating 
loan rates predominate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL: E43, E44, E52, G21, F34 
Keywords: Negative interest rates, bank profitability, NIMs, difference-in-differences 
estimation 
                                                          
6 The author is grateful to Yener Altunbas, Claudia Girardone, Iftekhar Hasan, Dave Humphrey, Daniel 
McGowan, Enrico Onali, Phil Molyneux, Klaus Schaeck, Jonathan Williams, Bob De Young and Ru Xie for the 
precious comments. All errors are my responsibility. The author also thank the precious comments received at the 
7th Bundesbank Workshop on Banks and Financial Market and the International Rome Conference on Money, 
Banking and Finance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), policy-makers have been facing a challenging 
economic situation dominated by economic stagnation, high unemployment and deflation. As 
a first monetary policy response, central banks cut interest rates aggressively through 
conventional accommodative monetary policies. However, when interest rates approached the 
zero lower bound (ZLB) without producing the hoped for effects on nominal spending and 
inflation, many central banks implemented a range of unconventional monetary policies 
(UMPs) including large scale asset purchase (LSAPs), in the form of quantitative easing, as 
well as policy rate forward guidance7. UMP took a step further from 2012 onwards when 
several countries/regions (Denmark, the Euro Area, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
and Japan) implemented negative interest rates policy (NIRP) in order to provide further 
economic stimulus to constantly weak economies8. The aim of NIRP (see Couere’. 2016) is to 
increase the cost to banks of holding excess reserves at the central bank encouraging them to 
take them back on the balance sheet. This should lead to beneficial outcomes for the real 
economy coming mostly from a greater supply and demand for loans due to the decline in 
funding costs for both banks and borrowers. Nevertheless, going beyond the barrier determined 
by the ZLB and pushing rates9 into “uncharted” negative territory deserves serious 
consideration and analyses. In this regard, the “how low for how long” question has raised 
concern about the long-term effect of this policy on financial intermediaries’ performance and 
on the economy as a whole (see, McAndrews, 2015)10. A cut in interest rates into negative 
territory may increase bank profitability if there is significant loan growth and margins are 
unaffected, or/and if banks boost fee and commission income on the back of greater lending. 
However, if banks are unable to reduce deposit rates to the same extent as loan rates then 
margins will be compressed, and if there is limited loan growth and/or cross-selling of fee and 
commission services then profits will likely fall. If the latter is the case, the decline in profits 
can erode bank capital bases and further limit credit growth thus stifling NIRP monetary 
                                                          
7 See Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Chung et al (2012) for the impact of the zero lower bound constraint 
and Gambacorta et al. (2012), Borio and Zabai (2016) and Hamilton et al. (2012) for the effectiveness of 
unconventional monetary policies.  
8 See Bech and Malkhozov (2015) for a discussion of the implementation mechanisms of NIRP in adopting 
countries. The time of introduction of NIRP is noted in Table A1 in the appendix. 
9 $12 trillion of bonds in 2016 were traded at negative yield (see Kunz 2016). 
10 There has been discussion that negative rates promote bubbles in the bond and housing markets. In our analysis, 
we will focus on the performance of the banking sector. 
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transmission effects. This influence of NIRP on bank performance may further be aggravated 
in the European context where banks have been struggling to maintain (respectable) levels of 
profitability because of a slow economic recovery, historically high levels of non-performing 
loans, and a post GFC and European sovereign debt crisis deleveraging phase. 
 
We contribute to the existing literature, which focuses on low and/or more ‘normal’ interest 
rate environments by evaluating the impact of an unexplored monetary policy instrument as 
the NIRP on net interest margins (NIMs) and bank profitability. We employ a bank-level 
database comprising 7242 banks in 33 OECD countries for the period 2012-2016 and a 
difference-in-differences methodology. This methodology allows us to draw conclusion as to 
whether banks’ NIMs and profitability in NIRP adopter countries were impacted differently 
than countries that did not adopt the policy. Moreover, it permits us to analyse both 
macroeconomic and bank-level factors that affect performance in the uncharted territory of 
NIRP. We find that NIM and return-on-assets (ROAs) show a strong contraction after NIRP 
implementation. Our results highlight that NIM contraction reduces banks’ profitability, 
despite the case that lower rates can boost bank profits through valuation gains on fixed-income 
securities (direct) and a reduced cost of non-performing loans (indirect). Finally, the negative 
effect on profits and margins appears to have been stronger for banks that are small, operating 
in countries where markets are more competitive and floating interest rates predominate. 
 
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 reviews the academic literature on the impact of 
interest rates on bank profitability and margins. Section 3 introduces our data and methodology. 
Section 4 presents our results along with several robustness checks and the final section 
concludes. 
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2. Literature Review  
 
Our study is based on the literature that analyses the effects of interest rates on bank 
performance. While there is an extensive literature on the determinants of bank margins and 
profits that follow the pioneering work of Ho and Saunders (1981), the literature evaluating 
interest rates, monetary policy and bank performance is still somewhat limited11. One of the 
first empirical papers dates back to the early 1980s, in which the switch from low to high 
interest rates determined by the “Volcker doctrine”12 raised concerns about the soundness and 
stability of commercial banks and saving and loans associations (“thrift” institutions) that 
“borrow short and lend long”. In this context, Flannery (1981) finds that, while drastic interest 
rate changes can threaten bank stability, large U.S banks mitigate these risks by hedging against 
interest rate risk modifying assets and liabilities in order to have similar average maturities. 
Hancock (1985) notes that if monetary policy does not affect the spread between interest 
earning assets and liabilities, an increase in interest rates tends to boost bank profits. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999) were among the first to investigate the effect of real interest rates on 
bank margins and profitability. Using cross-country and bank-specific data on margins, they 
find that high real interest rates are associated with higher NIMs and profitability - especially 
in emerging economies where deposit rates are frequently targeted by policymakers to be 
below-market rates. English (2002), studying the link between interest rate risk exposure and 
bank margins in ten OECD countries over the period 1979-1999, points out that the average 
yield on bank assets is more closely related to long-term rates than the average yield on 
liabilities, hence a steep yield curve should be associated with higher NIMs. In a similar 
fashion, Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) also use data of ten OECD countries over 1981-
2003 and aggregate income statement data to show that short-term and long-term rates have a 
differential influence on bank margins13. While short-term rate seems to have no impact on 
margins, a 1% increase in long-term rates increases NIMs from 1% after a year to up to 4% in 
the long-run, hence margins react mainly to the slope of the yield curve. The relation between 
the slope of the yield curve and bank profitability has been evidenced also by Alessandri and 
Nelson (2014) with reference to the UK banking sector. Again, their findings suggest that in 
                                                          
11The literature on the determinants of net interest margins and profits is extensive. We refer to section 3 for a 
select overview of studies on the determinants of bank margins and profits. 
12 Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve during the period 1979-1987, is credited with ending the high 
level of inflation in the United States by using tight monetary policies and high interest rates.  
13 In their model Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) define short-term and long-term interest rate using the 3-
month interbank rate and the rate on long term government bonds, respectively.  
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the long-run (measured using ten-year government bond yields) higher interest rates have an 
unambiguous positive effect on bank profitability and margins.  
 
Size and specialness appear to be key factors that enable banks to hedge against interest rate 
risk avoiding excessive NIMs and profit volatility in ‘normal’ operating environments. In this 
regard, Angbazo (1997) finds that U.S banks with assets size greater than $1 billion have net 
interest income that is not sensitive to interest risk volatility, while the opposite is found for 
small regional banks. Specialness, assets composition and size are also found to be important 
by Hanweck and Ryu (2005). Using a sample of U.S banks, they underline how small regional 
banks and mortgage specialists are particularly affected by the volatility of interest rates.  
 
There are also a limited number of studies that focus specifically on bank profitability and 
margins in a low interest rate environment. Genay and Podjasek (2014) indicate that U.S banks 
face decreasing NIMs and returns during periods of low interest rates – and (again) the effect 
is particularly strong for small institutions. However, they also suggest that the benefits of low 
rates (in terms of boosting economic activity) outweigh the costs. Opposing findings have been 
reported by Covas et al. (2015) who show that, during a period of low interest rates (2010-2015 
in their sample), NIMs decline more markedly for large U.S banks (70 basis points against 20 
for small banks14) because small banks benefit more from a fall in deposit costs. Claessens et 
al. (2017), investigating 47 countries, find that low interest rates have a significantly greater 
impact on bank ROAs and NIMs than high rates. Although profitability appears to be less 
affected than margins, persistently low interest rates also reduce the ability of banks to be 
profitable. Hence, while a cut in interest rates has the short-term effect of negatively impacting 
NIMs, in the long-term there is an adverse pass through to profitability. Busch and Memmel 
(2015), studying the German market during ‘normal’ and low interest rate periods, find a small 
but positive effect of long-term rates on bank margins. However, they state that, during periods 
of low interest rates, the ZLB constraint on deposit products puts additional stress on banks’ 
margins. 
 
Empirical analysis of the influence of NIRP on bank margins and profits links to the 
unconventional monetary policy (UMP) literature. NIRP is one type of UMP together with 
Quantitative Easing (QE) (large-scale asset purchases) and policy guidance that manages down 
                                                          
14 Small banks are defined in this study as having assets less than $50 billion.  
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long-term interest rate expectations. These policies not only reduce market interest rates but 
expand and modify the size and composition15 of both central bank’s and commercial bank’s 
balance sheets that can impact margins and profitability. In this regard, Lambert and Ueda 
(2014), using a sample of U.S banks over 2007-2012 report a negative relation between the 
size of central bank’s assets and NIMs. When central banks expand their balance sheets this 
helps push down interest rates reducing bank funding costs but the influence is offset by 
reduced revenues from new loans. Deposit rates are more ‘sticky-downward’ than loan rates 
and compresses margins reducing profits. Similar results have been displayed by Alessandri 
and Nelson (2014) who show that Bank of England balance sheet expansion has a negative 
influence on NIMs16.  
 
Our contribution to the literature is important in three respects. First, as outlined in the 
aforementioned studies, persistently low interest rates are found to adversely impact bank 
profits and margins. If this is valid for low interest rates, breaking the ZLB with negative rates 
might even be more problematic given the reluctant attitude of banks to start charging 
customers for their deposits (“stickiness”). Secondly, the literature on NIRP is still small and 
generally comprises overviews of developments in key banking and other financial aggregates 
in the immediate pre- and post-NIRP periods rather than rigorous econometric analysis. 
Moreover, studies examining the effects of NIRP (see Jobst and Lin (2016), Arteta et al. (2015), 
Bech and Malkhozov (2015)) point to the compression of NIMs as lending rates for new loans 
decline and existing (variable-rate) loans re-price while deposit rates remain sticky-
downward17, but they do not use bank-level data to explicitly test to see if this is actually the 
case. If this is indeed the case, all other things being equal, it will lead to a reduction in 
profitability and this may reduce the effectiveness of this new monetary policy tool if banks 
reduced profits curtails lending activity. Third, we perform various robustness checks to 
validate our results. These provide more information on specific type of banks and countries 
financial features that can influence the impact of NIRP.  
 
Our paper adds to the aforementioned literature by examining the impact of NIRP on margins 
and profits using a dataset comprising 7242 banks in 33 OECD countries over 2012-2016 and 
                                                          
15 See Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) for an explanation of unconventional monetary policies. 
16 Both studies apply panel regressions and GMM estimation.  
17 The relation between monetary policy changes and the stickiness of deposits has been extensively analysed (see 
Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a review). 
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a difference-in-differences methodology. Our main finding is that bank margins and profits fell 
in NIRP-adopter countries compared to countries that did not adopt the policy. The results are 
robust to a variety of checks. The adverse NIRP effect on bank performance appears to have 
been stronger for banks that were small, operating in competitive system as well as in countries 
where floating loan rates predominate.  
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
 3.1 Methodology  
 
To capture the effect of NIRP on ROA and NIMs we use a difference-in-differences 
methodology. This methodology has been widely used in the policy evaluation literature and 
more recently to banking and financial sector issues (Beck et al (2010); Calderon and Schaeck 
(2013); Berger et al. (2014); Fiordelisi et al. (2016)). The advantage of this approach is that it 
allows to use a panel data set-up to compare a treated group of banks (those impacted by the 
policy change) with those that are not affected (the control group or untreated banks). The 
approach also helps to control for the ‘omitted variable bias’18. Our baseline specification takes 
the following form: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡) + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (1) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the NIM (or ROA)
19 of bank i in country j at time t, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if bank 𝑖 in country 𝑗 has been affected by NIRP and 0 otherwise, 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after the period that country 𝑗 at time 𝑡 decided 
to implement NIRP and 0 before that period20, and 𝛽3 represents the average difference in NIM 
and ROA between countries that switched to NIRP and countries that did not. We also include 
𝛾𝑖, and 𝜑𝑡, to capture, respectively, bank and year fixed effects and limit the potential for bias 
                                                          
18 For example, regulatory changes (such as Basel III) may affect treated and untreated bank performance alike, 
regardless of the NIRP intervention. But as these changes may affect banks similarly, the difference-in-differences 
approach avoids this bias by differencing away common trends affecting both groups 
19Following Borio et al (2015) and Claessens et al. (2017), we define bank net interest margins as the difference 
between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by the amount of interest earning assets. 
Return on assets is calculated by dividing bank’s net income by its assets. 
20 The vast majority of NIRP countries in our sample introduced NIRP in 2014, hence 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡  taking value 1 from 
2014. However, since Sweden, Norway and Switzerland introduced NIRP in 2015 we adapted the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡  dummy 
accordingly.  
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in estimates of 𝛽3. We include bank-specific dummies to control for time-invariant, unobservable 
bank characteristics that can shape bank NIMs and ROAs. We include year fixed effects to control for 
possible shocks over the sample period that can affect bank NIMs and ROAs such as other monetary 
policies and changes in regulation. All regressions are estimated with bank-level clustering, namely 
allowing for correlation in the error terms. We use robust standard errors to control for 
heteroscedasticity and dependence (see Bertrand et al. (2004); Petersen (2007) and Donald and Lang 
(2007).  
 
We introduce bank- and country-specific controls in a second specification that takes the form: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (2) 
 
where 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of bank- and country-specific characteristics to capture cross-bank and 
cross-country heterogeneity over time that can affect NIMs and ROAs21. Bank-specific 
variables are a combination of balance sheet and performance measures. Our control variables 
are in-line with the literature on the determinant of NIMs and profits. We include four bank-
specific and two country-specific control variables that have been shown in the literature to 
explain banks’ performance. The first variable is size (size) measured by the logarithm of bank 
total assets. According to Goddard et al. (2004) and Mirzaei et al. (2013) banks size affects 
profits positively through the realisation of economies of scale. However, as suggested by 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) large efficient banks 
apply lower margins to customers through increasing returns to scale, hence we expect profits 
and margins to have the opposite signs in relation to size. Several studies (McShane and Sharpe 
(1985); Saunders and Schumacher (2000); Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004)) use the 
ratio of equity to total assets (E/TA) as a proxy for bank risk aversion. A positive relation is 
                                                          
21 The inclusion of covariates in a difference-in-differences framework presents advantages but also disadvantages 
(Lechner 2010). On the one hand, introducing explanatory covariates can have the positive advantage of detecting 
cross-bank and cross-country heterogeneity that can potentially affect bank NIMs and ROAs independently by 
the introduction of NIRP. On the other hand, the introduction of covariates can cause two main problems. First, 
when banks are relatively homogeneous in both the treatment and control group, additional covariates can weaken, 
instead of strengthening, the likelihood that both groups maintain the parallel trend, hence violating our 
assumption. Second, time varying covariates can change or be influenced by the post-treatment period, leading to 
endogeneity problems. We assess this problem in several ways. First, we test the control variables for 
multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor (VIF). A mean VIF of 1.07 suggests that our controls are not 
highly correlated. Second, we provide t-test statistics to show that the control variables are not homogenous among 
treated and untreated banks (see section 3.2 and Table 1). Finally, to avoid the possibility that time varying control 
variables can be influenced by the intervention (the NIRP introduction), we test the control variables as dependent 
variables in the difference-in-difference specification. As expected, the test (not reported) suggests that our control 
variables are not affected by the intervention.   
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expected between this variable and margins22. Risk averse banks will require higher margins 
to cover the greater cost of equity. A positive relation is expected also with reference to 
profitability as suggested by Berger (1995). Banks with higher franchise value and well-
capitalised face lower expected bankruptcy and funding costs. We also use liquidity (Carbo 
and Fernandez (2007) and a credit risk measure (Carbo and Fernandez (2007); Poghosyan 
(2012) and Almarzoqi and Naceur (2015)) to explain bank margins. In this context, we use the 
ratio of liquid securities to total assets (liquidity) and the loan loss provision to gross loans ratio 
(credit risk), respectively. We expect that less liquid and credit riskier banks, apply a premium 
to margins. 
 
The country-specific variables are broad measures of macroeconomic performance and include 
GDP growth (GDP growth) and consumer price inflation (inflation). Athanasouglu et al (2008) 
recognise a twofold GDP growth effect on bank performance. On one hand, GDP growth has 
a positive effect on bank profits coming from a greater demand for loans. In contrast, there may 
be a negative relationship if the supply of funds (deposits) declines due to a rise in consumption 
in-line with GDP growth. The extended literature (Molyneux and Thornton (1992); Boyd et al 
(2001); Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2004), Gelos (2006); Almarzoqi and Naceur (2015)) has also 
demonstrated a positive relationship between nominal inflation and bank margins and profits. 
The economic uncertainty induced by high inflation rates is compensated for by higher spreads.  
 
The difference-in-differences approach requires that three assumptions hold. First, the control 
group must constitute a valid counterfactual for the treatment23. Second, assignment of the 
treatment has to be exogenous with respect to bank performance. In other words, the policy 
action (‘intervention’) should affect bank performance and not vice versa. As explained in the 
introduction, the aim of NIRP is to increase the cost to banks of holding excess reserves at the 
central bank encouraging them to take them back on the balance sheet and increase the supply 
of loans. Hence, influencing bank performance (profits and margins) is not the policy-makers 
main target but rather reflects a secondary effect. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that, prior to the 
introduction of NIRP, NIMs and ROAs moved in a similar direction but the relationship 
changed thereafter. This is confirmed when we examine the third requirement of a ‘parallel 
                                                          
22 Macroeconomic theorists such as Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) suggest a negative relation. A higher net worth 
(equity) relative to the capital stock reduces the expected default probability (everything else equal). Thus, banks 
can charge lower margins to customers.  
23 We provide evidence that this assumption holds in the next section.  
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trend assumption’24. Figures 1 depicts levels of NIMs and ROAs from 2011 to 2016 for both 
NIRP adopter and non-adopter countries. Both NIM and ROA move in the same direction in 
the pre-treatment period, indicating that the parallel trend assumption holds. Since June 2014, 
when policy rates in most of the NIRP adopter countries turned negative, NIRP affected banks 
register the worst performance since 2011 with level falling below 2% for NIM in 2014-2015 
and below 0.40% for ROA in 2015.  
 
Figure 1. Average NIM/ROA among treated banks (blue line) and non-treated banks (red line) 
from 2011 – 2016. 
  
 
 
 
3.2 Data  
 
We rely on Jobst and Lin (2016) for dating the adoption of NIRP regimes and construct a 
dataset combining information mostly from two main sources25. The macroeconomic series are 
from Thompson DataStream and the bank balance and performance data are from Orbis Bank 
Focus. Since Orbis comprises of cross-country banks that operate in more than one countries, 
the balance sheet data can either refer to consolidated values across subsidiaries or 
unconsolidated accounts based on the country of bank headquarters. To avoid concerns of 
banks that operate in more than one countries in both treated and not treated groups, we retain 
bank accounts that are either unconsolidated (U1 and U2 codes in Orbis) or consolidated but 
                                                          
24According to Bertrand et al. (2004) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) the difference-in-differences is valid 
only under the restrictive assumption that changes in the outcome variable (in our case bank profits and NIM) 
over time would have been exactly the same in both treatment (countries that experienced NIRP) and control 
groups (no NIRP) in the absence of the intervention (the introduction of NIRP). 
25 See Table A1 for the dating of NIRP.  
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not with an unconsolidated subsidiary. Our sample covers 7242 financial institutions 
(commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks and bank holding companies) from 33 
OECD countries over 2012 - 201626. The treated countries include those of the Euro Area, 
Hungary, Sweden and Switzerland.27 Descriptive statistics for bank ROAs and NIMs, other 
bank balance sheet variables, and the macroeconomic series in the treatment and control groups 
of countries are shown in Table 1.28  
 
Panel A and B of Table 1 presents summary statistics on the aforementioned balance sheet 
data. Panel C displays macroeconomic condition and monetary policy variables descriptive 
statistics29. Bank profitability and margin may also be driven by other macroeconomic, market 
and monetary policy factors. Accordingly, we control for a wide range of potentially important 
explanatory control variables in the regression models. Following Carbo and Fernandez (2007), 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004), Hawtrey and Liang (2008) Maudos and Solis 
(2009), Lepetit et al. (2008), Almarzoqi and Naceur (2015) and Entrop et al. (2015), we use 
the Lerner index (Lerner index) to control for competition in the banking sector30. The Lerner 
index is the difference between the price and the total margin cost as a proportion of the price 
and has been taken from the World Bank Global Financial Development Database. It ranges 
between 0 (perfect competition) and 1 (monopoly). It is inversely proportional to banking 
competition. NIRP is expected to have a more marked impact in more competitive systems as 
changes in policy rates are likely to be passed on more effectively. 
  
                                                          
26 The sample period is intentionally short. According to Roberts and Whited (2013) and Bertrand et al. (2004) 
the change in the treatment group should be concentrated around the onset of the treatment. Moving away leads 
to unobservables and other factors that affect the treatment outcome leading to omitted variable bias threatening 
the validity of the model.  
27 We exclude Japan in our sample as the country only adopted NIRP in early 2016, which provides too short a 
period to examine the impact of NIRP on profits and margins.  
28 We also estimate Pearson correlation coefficients for the macroeconomic variables in the treatment and control 
group. The significance of coefficients suggests that the countries in the two groups experienced a similar 
macroeconomic environment validating the fact that the control group constitutes a valid counterfactual scenario 
for the treatment. This finding, together with the parallel trend assumption that we report in Figures 1 and 2, 
further supports our decision to choose a difference-in-differences methodology in our analysis. We arbitrarily 
chose a longer time period (in comparison with the sample period) to highlight that these macroeconomic 
indicators move together for several years after the GFC. 
29 Equality of means t-test is also performed.  
30 We prefer the non-structural Lerner index measure of competition over a concentration measure such as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). There are, in fact, different views about competition and concentration in the 
literature. Claessens and Laeven (2003), for example, point out that there are some countries, such as U.S, that 
shows levels of monopolistic competition in banking despite the relatively low level of concentration and large 
number of banks, while countries like Canada are highly competitive, although the level of concentration is high 
and number of banks relatively small. Beck and Hesse (2009) suggest that concentration measures are not 
satisfactory measures of the degree of market competition in the banking industry.  
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As other UMP policies, including central banks’ asset purchase programs (Di Maggio et. al, 
2016; Rodnyanski and Darmouni, 2016; Kandrac and Schulsche, 2016; Chakraborty et. al, 
2017), were conducted at the same time as NIRP we include variables to account for these 
effects. In-line with Gambacorta et al. (2014), Lambert and Ueda (2014), and Alessandri and 
Nelson (2015) we employ the log growth rate of a country’s central bank balance sheet 
(CB_GR). We also use the log growth rate of the monetary base (M0_GR) as further controls 
to isolate the impact of other UMP’s on bank NIMs and ROAs. According to the 
aforementioned studies other UMP’s are also expected to compress margins and therefore (we 
expect) bank profits. This is investigated in the robustness check section 4.2 of the paper.  
 
Finally, we try to disentangle the impact of NIRP on bank margins and profitability in those 
countries that for historical or cultural reasons have a preference for lending at a floating or 
fixed rate basis. One would expect the impact of NIRP to be greater in countries where floating 
rates are more prevalent. Following Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) we address this issue 
by using the share of variable rate loans in total loans to households and non-financial 
corporations (floating-fixed rate) taken from the ECB Statistical Warehouse to identify 
countries where the bulk of lending is at a variable or fixed rate. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Control and Treatment Group 
 
I. Treatment group:  II. Control group 
             
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max   
Panel A: Bank Profitability and Margin            
NIM 16956 2.00%*** 0.90% 0.52% 3.08%  9017 2.74%*** 1.36% 0.39% 6.15%   
ROA 17133 0.43%*** 0.50% 0 1.26%  9268 0.91%*** 0.75% -0.10% 3.26%   
              
Panel B: Bank Balance Sheet  Data            
Size 17186 13.78*** 1.59% 11.51 16.58  9658 14.35*** 2.02% 11.21 17.63   
E/TA 17182 10.14%*** 4.75% 4.07% 21.76%  9654 16.55%*** 13.91% 5.47% 51.27%   
Liquidity 16444 21.49%*** 15.04% 0.01% 46.68%  8715 22.23%*** 20.00% 0.01% 64.85%   
Credit risk 9888 5.88%*** 5.47% 0.48% 17.25%  6081 2.69%*** 2.62% 0.19% 8.46%   
              
Panel C: Macroeconomic Conditions and Monetary Policy          
GDP growth 20456 0.25%*** 0.56% -0.19% 6.62%  46240 0.52%*** 0.17% -1.13% 1.89%   
Inflation 20456 0.99%*** 0.77% -1.73% 4.39%  46244 1.51%*** 1.17% -1.73% 8.93%   
CB_GR 15342 -7.34%*** 14.22% -22.06% 23.44%  25066 16.93%*** 13.59% -14.33% 37.80%   
M0_GR 13448 8.35%*** 12.78% -7.89% 51.56%  44788 9.65%*** 8.00% -26.63% 18.77%   
Deposit Rate 3486 0.69%*** 1.01% -0.18% 5.29%  3988 4.31%*** 5.34% 0.03% 16.77%   
Lending Rate 4788 4.02%*** 1.24% 2.68% 9.00%  43385 3.25%*** 0.78% 0.80% 9.26%   
Lerner Index 20456 0.16*** 0.78% 0.67 0.41  45400 0.32 0.04% 0.11 0.44   
Floating-Fixed Rate 18208 71.39% 18.08% 32.95% 98.10%         
              
 
Note: NIM is the yearly difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by total interest earning assets; ROA is the yearly net income to total asset ratio; Size is 
the natural logarithm of bank total asset; E/TA is the ratio of bank equity to total assets; Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid securities to total assets; Credit risk is the ratio of loan loss reserve to 
gross loans; Lerner is the Lerner index; GDP_GR is the yearly growth rate of real GDP; Inflation is the yearly Consumer Price Index in percentage;; CB_GR is the monthly logarithm growth rate 
of central bank balance sheet size; M0_GR is the logarithm growth rate of the money supply  M0; Deposit Rate is the country level aggregate deposit rate in percentage; Lending Rate is the 
country level aggregate of lending rate in percentage; Spread is the difference between lending and deposit rates; Floating-Fixed Rate is the share of variable loans in total loans to household and 
non-financial corporation taken from the ECB Statistical Warehouse Database. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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4 Empirical results 
 
4.1 Baseline results 
 
The results from estimating equations (1) and (2) are presented in table 2 and 3. All the 
estimates include fixed bank and time effects. Table 2 and 3 report the estimates where the 
dependent variables are the NIMs (Table 2) and ROAs (Table 3), respectively. For both 
variables we incrementally introduce a set of bank and country control variables31. Our main 
interest is the size, sign and statistical significance of the coefficient of 𝛽3 that represents the 
average difference in the change of NIMs and ROAs between countries that adopted NIRP and 
those that did not, denoted in the table as the NIRP-effect. The baseline results reported in 
columns 1 of Tables 2 and 3 excludes all control variables. The coefficient of NIRP-effect is 
sizeable, negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for both dependent variables, 
indicating that countries where central banks implemented NIRP experienced a decline in 
NIMs and ROAs of around 12.60% and 6.27% respectively, relative to those countries where 
central banks did not follow the same policy32. In-line with expectations the size of the 
coefficient on NIMs are nearly double that of ROA. This leads to two preliminary conclusions. 
First, NIRP directly causes a compression of banks’ margins suggesting that they are unable to 
reduce deposit rates to the same extent as loan rates. Second, the contraction in NIMs (as a key 
component of bank profitability) indirectly drags down bank ROAs but to a lesser extent – a 
fall in margins reduces profits but not to the same extent as the overall effect is likely mitigated 
by lower/negative rates boosting non-interest income (via increased security valuations, trading 
income and such like)33. The remaining columns of the tables present the results from adding 
bank- and country- specific controls sequentially. The baseline regression result holds up well 
in the face of all controls—though the size of the coefficient is diminished somewhat (with the 
marginal effect varying between 9.06% (column 8) and 13.10% (column 2) for NIM, and 
                                                          
31 In trying to avoid biased estimation, we remove credit risk in the ROAs regression as it causes an excessive 
variation in the NIRP-effect coefficient.  
32This has been known for a long time. Samuelson (1945) mentioned:” the banking system as a whole is 
immeasurably helped rather than hindered by an increase in interest rate”.   
33We later test this to see whether NIRP resulted in an increase in non-interest income. For this exercise, we run 
two difference-in-differences baseline regressions (Table A2 in the appendix) using the ratios of non-interest 
income to gross income and net fees and commission to total assets (according to Jobst and Lin (2016) and Arteta 
et al. (2015) banks should increase fees and commissions to compensate for the decline in interest earnings). The 
result suggests that NIRP-affected banks experienced an increase in non-interest income (NII), and fees and 
commissions (FEE), relative to those banks unaffected by the policy. This provides an explanation of the 
differences between NIMs and ROAs with the former declining more markedly than the latter.  
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between 3.54% (column 7) and 6.20% (column 1) for ROA)34. The coefficients on the NIRP-
effect remain negative and significant at the 1% level in all estimates. The covariates are mostly 
significant at conventional levels (although with small coefficients) with signs in-line with the 
literature on the determinants of NIMs and ROAs. The E/TA variable is positively correlated 
with NIMs suggesting that less leveraged and more profitable banks register higher margins. 
In contrast, liquidity, and credit risk are negatively related to NIM indicating that banks that 
are less liquid and with large non-performing assets apply higher margins to compensate for 
greater risks. Size and E/TA appear to be the main factors driving bank ROAs, while less liquid 
banks are the ones, in our sample, that show the largest profit reductions. Among the 
macroeconomic variables, the inflation rate displays a strong positive coefficient for both NIMs 
and ROAs suggesting that the low inflation decade since the GFC is another factor affecting 
banking sector performance35.  
                                                          
34 As suggested by Roberts and Whited (2013), a large discrepancy of the treatment coefficient with and without 
controls should raise a ‘red flag’. In our case, variation in the NIRP-Effect coefficient occurs when country control 
variables are introduced. To assess this problem we run two additional regressions removing country control 
variables and bank fixed effects and introducing country fixed-effects. The NIRP-Effect coefficient is significant 
and displays smaller variation with respect to the addition of country controls. This suggests that our country 
measures are not fully able to capture unobservable factors as country fixed effects. The results are not reported. 
However, they are available upon request.   
35 Similar tests (not reported) have been undertaken using another bank profitability measure (ROE). Although 
the NIRP-effect coefficient remains negative and is statistically significant, it does not hold-up well when the 
controls are introduced. This is not surprising. ROE is more variable and easy to manipulate by managers via 
share buy-backs, provisioning and other earnings management techniques. As our estimates also show, it is more 
strongly influenced by macroeconomic conditions. That is why the empirical banking literature has a strong 
preference for using ROA as a profits indicator. ROE results are not reported here but are available from the 
authors on request.   
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Table 2. NIRP and NIMs 
All regressions include fixed bank and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
            
  NIM(1)  NIM(2) NIM(3) NIM(4) NIM(5) NIM(6) NIM(7) NIM(8) 
         
NIRP-Effect -0.1260*** -0.1310*** -0.1250*** -0.1138*** -0.1177*** -0.1160*** -0.1070*** -0.0856*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0158) 
Size  -0.0371 0.0208 0.0022 -0.0952***   -0.0698 
  (0.0228) (0.0270) (0.0317) (0.0495)   (0.0509) 
E/TA   0.0053*** 0.0057*** 0.0105***   0.0108*** 
   (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0029)   (0.0029) 
Liquidity    -0.0010*** -0.0023***   -0.0024*** 
    (0.0003) (0.0006)   (0.0006) 
Credit risk     -0.0056***   -0.0041** 
     (0.0016)   (0.0017) 
GDP growth      -0.0619*** -0.0234* -0.0029 
      (0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0195) 
Inflation       0.0505*** 0.0416*** 
       (0.0061) (0.0070) 
         
Adj. R2 0.0553 0.0558 0.0603 0.0668 0.1109 0.0577 0.0636 0.1270 
N.Banks 7242 7242 7241 6895 4895 7241 7241 4894 
N.Obs 25973 25973 25965 24592 15474 25969 25969 15470 
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Table 3. NIRP and ROA 
All regressions include fixed bank and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
               
  ROA(1)  ROA(2) ROA(3) ROA(5) ROA(6) ROA(7) ROA(8) 
NIRP-Effect -0.0627*** -0.0620*** -0.0579*** -0.0374*** -0.0611*** -0.0576*** -0.0312*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.012) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0123) 
Size  0.0060 0.0437** 0.0442*   0.0496* 
  (0.0158) (0.020) (0.0260)   (0.0262) 
E/TA   0.0033*** 0.0057***   0.00584*** 
   (0.0012) (0.0017)   (0.0017) 
Liquidity    -0.0000   -0.0000 
    (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
GDP     -0.0104 0.0058 0.0074 
     (0.0130) (0.0143) (0.0153) 
CPI      0.0227*** 0.0251*** 
      (0.0054) (0.0054) 
        
Adj. R2 0.0080 0.0080 0.0140 0.0190 0.0086 0.0095 0.0210 
N.Banks 7359 7358 7357 6939 7358 7358 6938 
N.Obs 26401 26400 26394 24767 26397 26397 24763 
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4.2 Robustness checks 
 
In this section, we report results from a range of robustness checks that offer variations from 
our choice of controls used in the baseline model. As previously described, the aim of NIRP is 
to induce further reductions in interest rates as banks run down their excess reserve balances. 
However, since deposits (may) have a “price floor” set at zero, a decline in lending rates can 
lead to a contraction of NIMs36. We control for this effect by including in our analysis lending 
and deposit rates. The results are reported in panel A of table 4 (column 1-4). As expected, the 
NIRP coefficient becomes larger and is more significant. There is a strong positive relation 
between NIMs and the level of deposit rate and lending rate. It is interesting to note that lending 
rates have a larger impact on NIM than deposit rates - a 1% increase/decrease in lending rates 
leads to a 5.48% increase/decrease in NIM while for deposit rates the effect is a 1.45% change. 
This result suggests that, in a low and negative interest rates environment as in our sample, 
NIMs are more sensitive to changes in lending rather than deposit rates - confirming that 
deposits are downward ‘sticky’. Furthermore, the effect of deposit and loan rates on ROAs is 
insignificant37.  
 
NIRP was brought into the UMP mix by central banks several years after the adoption of other 
UMPs, and in particular the extensive use of outright asset purchases via QE. It is important to 
disentangle the effects of NIRP on profitability and margins from the effects of these policies. 
Outright asset purchases were aimed at expanding the central bank’s balance sheet to increase 
the level of the monetary base, encouraging banks to lend – in order (ultimately) to boost  
nominal spending (Bernanke and Reinhart 2004). Accordingly, we proxy for the use of other 
UMPs by including, alternatively, variables that take into account the central bank balance 
sheet size and (alternatively) the size of the monetary base. The results are reported in panel B 
of table 4 (column 1-3) and are important for two reasons. First, they are in-line with the studies 
of Lambert and Ueda (2014) and Alessandri and Nelson (2014) underlining the possible 
negative effect of UMP on margins. The coefficients of central banks asset growth (CB_GR) 
                                                          
36 However, in countries like Sweden and Denmark, where banks operate in a highly concentrated banking system 
and do not rely on retail deposit funding, banks can eventually decide to lower retail deposit rates below zero.  In 
section 4.2, we test the role of market competition and bank funding structure on different bank behaviours in a 
negative interest rate setting. 
37 A similar test has been undertaken computing bank-level loan and deposit rates. Following Carbo and Fernandez 
(2007), we define the price of loans as the ratio of interest income on loans and the price of deposits as the ratio 
of interest expenses on deposits. The results (not reported) are in-line with our aggregate measures.  
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and M0 growth (M0_GR) are negative and statistically significant (column 1 and 3). Second, 
the effect of UMP is diametrically the opposite for ROA (column 2 and 4). Hence, while UMP 
and NIRP play a complementary role in driving down NIMs, the latter appears to have 
cancelled out a substantial amount of the stimulus impact of central bank balance sheet 
expansion in terms of boosting bank profits.  
 
As a further robustness check, we alter our country sample and focus only on European 
countries where the treatment group includes only European NIRP adopters and the control 
group includes only European non-NIRP adopters.  These results are reported in panel C of the 
table 4 (column 1 and 2). The coefficients of NIRP in both cases remains negative and 
statistically significant (in the case of NIM the relationship is stronger than in the baseline 
regression)38. 
 
As a final robustness check, we try to eliminate the possibility that bank margins and 
profitability in the treatment group may have altered prior to the introduction of NIRP—for 
example, in anticipation of the adverse effects of NIRP, or for some bank-specific reasons—
thereby invalidating our choice of difference-in-differences estimation. If the estimated 
coefficients on the ‘false’ NIRP are not statistically significant, we can be more confident that 
our baseline coefficient is capturing a genuine monetary policy shock. In panel D of the table 
we report results from estimates in which we extend our sample to the period from 2011 – 2014 
setting the introduction of a “fake” NIRP in 2013. The coefficient on the NIRP variable is still 
negative but smaller and not statistically significant adding further support to the validity of 
our baseline estimation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38  We follow the studies conducted by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) that 
use different control groups, as a further test to control for the omitted variables problem. Multiple control and 
treatment groups reduce biases and unobservable variables associated with just one comparison.  
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Table 4. Robustness checks 
 
 
NIM (1) ROA(2) NIM (3) ROA (4) 
a. Lending and deposit rates 
    
NIRP-effect -0.1993*** -0.0792*** -0.1493*** -0.0436*** 
 
(0.0163) (0.0131) (0.0288) (0.0218) 
lending rate 0.0548*** 0.0156 
  
 
(0.0163) (0.0121) 
  
deposit rate 
  
0.0145*** 0.0090 
   
(0.0198) (0.0161) 
     
Adj. R2 0.0440 0.0058 0.0396 0.0103 
N.Obs 10901 11112 5678 5738 
N.Banks 3142 3210 1719 1737 
b. Unconventional Monetary 
Policy (UMP)     
NIRP-effect -0.1520*** -0.0584*** -0.1620*** -0.0842*** 
 
(0.0144) (0.0108) (0.0142) (0.0105) 
CB_GR -0.0393* 0.0733*** 
  
 
(0.0209) (0.0196) 
  
M0_GR 
  
-0.0012*** 0.0005* 
   
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
     
Adj. R2 0.0723 0.0090 0.0612 0.0121 
N.Banks 7238 7354 5335 5422 
N.Obs 25212 25627 19486 19809 
c.NIRP and the EU 
    
NIRP-effect -0.179*** -0.0507***   
 (0.0267) (0.0175)   
     
Adj. R2 0.0950 0.0119   
N.Banks 5527 5623 
  
N.Obs 19897 20244 
  
d.fake-NIRP -0.0173 -0.0080   
NIRP-effect 0.0175 0.0161 
  
     
Adj. R2 0.0000 0.0001 
  
N.Banks 7183 7307 
  
N.Obs 20123 20472     
All regressions include fixed bank and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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4.2 Size, Competition and Asset Composition 
 
As suggested by Jobst and Lin (2016), Brunnermeier and Koby (2016) and Bech and 
Malkhozov (2015), the contraction in NIMs and erosion of profitability should be more marked 
for small banks operating in competitive markets and with floating rate assets. In this section, 
using the difference-in-differences framework, we create NIRP-adopter treatment groups and 
non-adopter control groups according to various bank-specific factors that the literature on 
NIRP suggest might affect bank behaviour in a negative interest rate setting. Specifically, we 
focus on bank size, market competition and asset interest rate composition. First, we examine 
the impact of NIRP on NIMs and ROAs by running percentile regressions based on size. The 
results reported in Tables 5 are important in two respects. First, the largest banks show a 
significantly smaller contraction in margins (4.1% compared to 21.1% for the smallest (panel 
A in columns 1 and 4)) and statistically insignificant influence on profitability. Following 
dell’Ariccia et al. (2010), this result suggests that NIRP enables large wholesale funded banks 
to take greater advantage of a declining funding costs partially offsetting pressure on margins 
and profitability. Second, the coefficients get larger in magnitude as banks size shrinks. This is 
in-line with the literature mentioned in section 1 indicating that large banks, through hedging 
and diversification, are better able to protect themselves against interest rate risk39. 
 
As a second test, we assess the impact of NIRP in the context of competitive conditions in 
banking markets. In this case, we use the Lerner index as a proxy for competition conditions40. 
Sørensen and Werner (2006) argue that banks operating in a less competitive environment 
make slower adjustments to interest rates (and therefore to NIMs), which slows the 
transmission of monetary policy. Brunnermeier and Koby (2016) present a “reversal interest 
rate” hypothesis according to which there is a rate of interest at which 
accommodative monetary policy “reverses” its effect and becomes contractionary. They show 
that low interest policy is likely to have a more limiting effect on bank lending in competitive 
                                                          
39 If small banks do not increase non-interest income from NIRP, we can confidently say that the policy has a 
larger impact on reducing their ROA. In Table A3 (Panel A and Panel B) in the Appendix, we provide percentile 
regressions based on bank size for the impact on non-interest income and fees and commissions. The results 
confirm our hypothesis that small banks are the most affected (negatively) by NIRP in term of NIMs and ROAs 
as well as the least affected (positively) by NIRP in respect of non-interest income. Regressions (not reported) 
that include M0_growth as a control for UMPs also suggest a similar positive effect of UMPs on non-interest 
income and fees and commissions for large banks, while small banks are just marginally affected.  
40 For this exercise, similar tests were also undertaken using the Boone index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). The results obtained are in-line with the Lerner index. The results are not reported. However, they are 
available upon request.  
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markets because of the associated pressure on NIMs. As the Lerner index varies between 0 and 
1, we define a competitive market as those banking markets with a Lerner index smaller than 
0.50, vice versa for non-competitive. The results, reported in panels A and B of table 6, support 
the aforementioned studies: namely that the impact of NIRP on bank profits and margins in 
competitive markets is negative and statistically significant. In less competitive markets in 
contrast, the impact of NIRP is negative but statistically insignificant for NIM while positive 
and statistically significant for ROA suggesting that banks here are better able to maintain 
profitability and margins.
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Table 5. Bank size, NIM and ROA 
All the percentile regressions include fixed bank and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
                 
  Bank Size>75th percentile Bank Size>50th & <75th percentile Bank Size>25th & <50th percentile Bank Size>25th percentile 
  NIM(1) ROA(2) NIM(3) ROA(4) NIM(5) ROA(6) NIM(7) ROA(4) 
Panel a.  
NIRP-effect -0.0410**  -0.1460***  -0.1830***  -0.2110***  
 (0.0191)  (0.0229)  (0.0267)  (0.0437)  
 
Panel b.          
NIRP-effect  0.0261  -0.0519***  -0.0709***  -0.108*** 
  (0.0162)  (0.0188)  (0.0227)  (0.0279) 
         
         
Adj. R2 0.0324 0.0041 0.0820 0.0142 0.1050 0.0138 0.1020 0.0212 
N.banks 1944 1855 2064 2115 2164 2195 2090 2159 
N.Obs 6145 6514 6222 6637 6389 6629 6226 6621 
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Table 6. Banking sector competition and interest rate asset composition 
          
    NIM ROA   NIM ROA 
 
Panel A. 
Competitive   
Panel B. Non-
competitive    
NIRP-effect  -0.0798*** -0.0695***  -0.0327 0.0680*** 
  (0.0372) (0.0248)  (0.0205) (0.0207) 
       
Adj. R2  0.0964 0.0039  0.0187 0.0030 
N.Banks  4559 4640  3361 3443 
N.Obs  15096 15259  10877 11142 
 
Panel C. Fixed-
rate    
Panel D. 
Floating-rate    
NIRP-effect  0.0222 0.0286*  -0.0368** 0.0031 
  (0.0155) (0.0141)  (0.0141) (0.0107) 
       
Adj. R2  0.0058 0.0017  0.0244 0.0008 
N.Banks  3689 3773  6436 6543 
N.Obs   13095 13411   23066 23454 
All regressions include fixed bank and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
As a final test, we try to disentangle the effect of NIRP for floating-rate and fixed-rate countries41. 
According to Jobst and Lin (2016), Brunnermeier and Koby (2016) and Albertazzi and 
Gambacorta (2009), the impact of NIRP should have a greater effect on variable-rate loans and on 
new loans. Hence, banks having a higher proportion of outstanding floating rate loans/assets 
should be strongly adversely impacted by the new monetary regime compared to those that rely 
more on fixed rate assets. The ECB’s Statistical Warehouse provides data on the share of variable 
rate loans in total loans to household and non-financial corporations. Again, we split the sample 
dividing the treatment group into floating and fixed rate countries. For this exercise, we consider 
a floating rate country as having a share of variable rate loans to total loans greater than 50%, and 
vice versa for fixed-rate countries42.  The results are presented in panel C and D of table 6. While 
                                                          
41 As already mentioned in section 4.2, splitting control and treatment groups in different sub-groups allows us to 
reduce biases and unobservable variables associated with just one comparison, hence limiting the omitted variables 
bias.  
42 Germany, Austria, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia are, 
according to our computation, floating rate countries. Denmark, France, Hungary, Norway, Netherlands and Slovakia 
are fixed rate. 
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it is noticeable that there is a reduction in NIMs in floating rate countries (as expected), the results 
display also an increase in bank profits for floating rate countries as their margins are less affected 
by NIRP.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Since 2012, several central banks have adopted NIRP aimed at boosting real spending by 
facilitating an increase in the supply of bank loans. The policy has generated controversy with 
skeptics pointing to several factors that might complicate the transmission from negative policy 
rates to higher bank lending. One factor that has been mentioned is that NIRP could compress 
NIMs and, therefore, bank profits, which may limit a bank’s ability to lend. Empirical evidence on 
the impact of NIRP on bank behavior/performance is scant. In this paper, we provide new evidence 
that bank margins and profitability fared worse in NIRP-adopter countries than in countries that 
did not adopt the policy. Specifically, countries in which central banks implemented NIRP 
experienced a decline in NIMs and ROAs compared to those countries in which central banks did 
not follow this policy. This result holds and is robust to the inclusion of several bank-specific 
control variables. It also stands-up in the face of a wide array of robustness checks, including 
controlling for the effects of lending and deposit rates, other UMPs, for sub-sample analysis and 
to (possible) changes prior to the introduction of NIRP. Finally, our findings support recent 
discussion and preliminary analysis of the effect of NIRP on bank-specific factors (size, 
competition and interest rate asset composition) that make banks profitability more vulnerable in 
a negative interest rate environment.  
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Appendix  
Table.A1 Time of Adoption of NIRP. 
Country NIRP adoption date 
Austria June 2014            
Belgium June 2014   
Denmark July 2012   
Estonia June 2014   
Finland June 2014   
France June 2014   
Germany June 2014   
Greece June 2014   
Hungary March 2014   
Ireland June 2014   
Italy June 2014   
Luxembourg June 2014   
Netherlands June 2014   
Norway September 2015   
Portugal June 2014   
Slovakia June 2014   
Slovenia June 2014   
Spain June 2014   
Sweden February 2015   
Switzerland January 2015   
 
Table A2. NIRP, non-interest income, and fees and commissions 
All regressions include fixed bank and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
      
  NII (1) FEE (2) 
NIRP-effect 2.7970*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.2840) (0.0001) 
   
   
   
   
Adj. R2 0.0276 0.0050 
N.banks 7360 6880 
N.Obs 25744 24701 
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Table A3. NIRP, non-interest income, and fees and commissions 
All the percentile regressions include fixed bank and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in 
parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
                 
 
Bank Size>75th  
percentile 
Bank Size>50th &  <75th 
percentile 
Bank Size>25th & <50th 
percentile 
Bank Size>25th 
percentile 
  NII(1) FEE(1) NII(2) FEE(2) NII(3) FEE(3) NII(4) FEE(4) 
Panel A.          
NIRP-effect 2.507***  3.399***  3.219***  0.744  
 (0.443)  (0.491)  (0.606)  (0.842)  
Panel B         
NIRP-effect  0.0004***  0.0003***  0.0002  -0.00004 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Adj. R2 0.0157 0.0114 0.0345 0.00548 0.0669 0.00511 0.0174 0.0196 
N.banks 1950 1765 2079 1970 2165 2076 2091 1945 
N.Obs 6499 6197 6476 6234 6493 6309 6276 5961 
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CHAPTER 3: “You could lead a horse to water but you could not make him drink” Milton 
Friedman  
Did Negative Interest Rates Improve Bank Lending?43 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we employ a bank-level dataset comprising 6558 banks from 33 OECD member 
countries over 2012-2016 and a difference-in-differences methodology to analyze whether NIRP 
resulted in a change in bank lending in NIRP-adopter countries compared to those that did not 
adopt the policy. Our results suggest that following the introduction of negative interest rates, bank 
lending was weaker in NIRP-adopter countries than in countries that did not adopt the policy. The 
result is robust to a wide range of checks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL: E43, E44, E52, G21, F34 
Keywords: Negative interest rates, monetary policy transmission, bank lending, difference in 
differences estimation 
                                                          
43 The author is grateful for the precious comments received from Philip Molyneux, Klaus Schaeck, John Thornton 
and Ru Xie. The author also thanks the useful comments received at the Bangor Business School seminar series.  
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1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2008-09 resulted in the worst economic recession in advanced 
economies since the 1930s. Central banks initially responded by reducing policy interest rates 
sharply. When these rates approached zero without there being the hoped-for recovery in nominal 
spending, many central banks experimented with a range of unconventional monetary policies 
(UMP) to provide further stimulus, including large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) to raise asset 
prices and increase the supply of bank reserves, targeted asset purchases to alter the relative prices 
of different assets, and forward guidance to communicate about future policy rate paths. The 
effectiveness of these policies in raising nominal spending has been at the center of a vigorous 
policy and academic debate with no clear consensus emerging. Nonetheless, since 2012 six 
European economies (Denmark, the Euro area, Hungary, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) and 
Japan have taken unconventional monetary policy a step further by introducing a negative interest 
rate policy (NIRP) aimed at additional monetary accommodation.44 The primary objective of NIRP 
in adopter countries is to stabilize inflation expectations and support economic growth, and in 
Denmark and Switzerland the policy was also aimed at discouraging capital inflows to reduce 
exchange rate appreciation pressures (see Jobst and Lin, 2016). Support for the real economy was 
expected to come from a greater supply and demand for loans, with loan supply increasing as 
banks ran down their (large) excess reserve balances, and loan demand increasing in response to a 
further fall in lending rates. As for UMP more generally, NIRP fueled debate on the likelihood that 
it would be successful (see, for example, Arteta et al. 2016; Ball et al. 2016; Jobst and Lin, 2016). 
The key issues relate to NIRPs efficacy and limitation in stimulating economic growth and 
inflation, as well as how the policy influences bank profitability, financial stability, and exchange 
rates. Skeptics of NIRP (for example, McAndrews, 2015) point to several possible complications, 
including a limited pass-through to lending rates as banks may hold deposit rates steady to maintain 
the deposit funding base. Such behavior has an adverse influence on bank profitability, which can 
limit credit growth if banks charge higher lending rates or fees to cover losses, or if a diminished 
                                                          
44 See Bech and Malkhozov (2016) for a discussion of the implementation mechanisms of NIRP in adopting countries. 
The time of introduction of NIRP is noted in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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capital base makes banks more reluctant to lend. Other associated distortions in asset valuations 
can create asset price bubbles threatening financial stability. The empirical literature on NIRP and 
its effects is small and generally comprises overviews of developments in key banking and other 
financial aggregates in the immediate pre- and post-NIRP periods rather than rigorous econometric 
analysis (see Section 2). Our paper contributes to the literature by examining how NIRP has 
performed with respect to a key policy objective--achieving an increase in bank lending to support 
economic growth. To examine this issue, we employ a bank-level dataset comprising 6558 banks 
from 33 OECD member countries over the period 2012-2016 and use a difference-in-differences 
methodology. The methodology provides a sound basis for drawing conclusions as to whether 
NIRP resulted in a change in bank lending in NIRP-adopter countries compared to countries that 
did not adopt the policy. It also allows us to examine factors that might have been influential in 
the effectiveness of NIRP compared to other monetary policy frameworks. In contrast to the 
conclusions of most of the recent research in the area, we find that banks in NIRP-adopter countries 
reduce lending significantly compared to those in countries that do not adopt the policy. This 
adverse NIRP effect is stronger for banks that were smaller, more dependent on retail deposits, 
less well capitalized, had business models reliant on net interest margins, and operated in more 
competitive market environments.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related academic literature on NIRP. Section 
3 introduces our data and methodology. Section 4 presents our results along with several 
robustness checks to address threats to validity and a final section concludes. 
2. Related literature 
 
Until the global financial crisis, the benchmark monetary theory for many macroeconomists drew 
upon Wallace (1981) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) who viewed liquidity as having no 
further role once nominal policy rates reached their lower bound. After the crisis, various studies 
highlight mechanisms through which UMP (policy guidance, LSAPs and NIRP) can have an 
impact. Curdia and Woodford (2011) provide a model with heterogeneous agents and 
imperfections in private financial intermediation to demonstrate that UMP will affect the economy 
provided either an increase in banks’ reserves boosts lending to the private sector, or that UMP 
changes expectations about future interest-rate policy. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016) show 
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that UMP can work against adverse feedback loops that precipitate crises by affecting the prices 
of assets held by constrained agents. Drechsler et al. (2016) point out the role played by LSAPs, 
equity injections, and asset guarantees in supporting risky asset prices. Del Negro et al. (2017) 
investigate the effects of interventions in which the government provides liquidity in exchange for 
illiquid private paper once nominal interest rates reach the zero bound. Similarly, Brunnermeier 
and Koby (2016) present a “reversal interest rate” hypothesis according to which there is a rate of 
interest at which accommodative monetary policy “reverses” its effect and becomes 
contractionary. The reversal interest rate depends on such factors as the composition of banks' 
asset holdings, the degree of interest rate pass-through to loan  and deposit rates, and banks funding 
structures - they argue that quantitative easing increases the reversal rate  and should only be 
employed after interest rates cuts have been exhausted.45 
 
UMP relates to policies that guide longer-term interest rate expectations and expand and change 
the composition of central bank’s balance sheets (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004). It is aimed at 
facilitating credit expansion in order to boost economic growth. However, little is known about 
the effectiveness and pass-through of unconventional policy to bank lending. Studying the Term 
Auction Facility, Berger et al. (2017) find an increase in both short- and long-term lending for 
most loan categories. Focusing on the effect of UMP on bank lending in the U.S, Rodnyansky and 
Darmouni (2016) confirm that quantitative easing and mortgage backed securities purchases 
facilitated an increase in mortgage lending. However, Chakraborty et al. (2017) show that 
increased mortgage lending may crowd-out commercial lending at the same time.  Bowman et al. 
(2015) examine the effectiveness of the Bank of Japan’s injections of liquidity into the interbank 
market in promoting bank lending (using bank-level data from 2000 to 2009). They report a robust, 
positive, and statistically significant effect of bank liquidity positions on lending suggesting that 
the expansion of reserves associated with UMP likely boosted the flow of credit (although the 
overall increase was modest). Butt et al. (2015) report no evidence of a traditional bank lending 
                                                          
45 Our later empirical analysis test dimensions of the Brunnermeier and Koby (2016) hypothesis. 
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channel associated with LSAPs in the UK and suggest that this was because it gave rise to deposits 
that were likely to quickly leave banks.46 
 
The effect of NIRP is expected to be transmitted via lower money market and bank lending rates 
to households and corporates (Jobst and Lin, 2016). These lower rates impact both sides of bank’s 
balance sheets. When lower policy rates are transmitted to bank loan rates, they reduce the value 
of bank assets. Conversely, lower policy rates also reduce the cost of bank liabilities, namely, 
lower funding expenses. Heider et al. (2017) find that when policy rates remain positive, deposit 
rates closely track policy rates. However, when policy rates turn negative, banks that rely on 
deposit funding are reluctant to reduce deposit rates fearing a loss of their funding base.  In cases 
where sticky deposit rates compress lending margins, banks tend to shift activities toward fee-
based services.  Ball et al. (2016) survey recent developments in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in NIRP-adopter countries. They argue that policy rate cuts below zero are generally 
transmitted to bank lending rates, although sluggishly. They also conclude that there is no clear 
relationship between NIRP and bank credit expansion. Arteta et al. (2016) suggest that lending 
rates generally decline under NIRP, particularly in countries with greater bank competition, but 
pass-through is only partial due to downward rigidities in retail deposit rates (reflecting the 
importance of retail deposits as a source of bank funding).  In two recent studies that focus on 
NIRP in the Euro area Bräuning and Wu (2017) suggest that negative rate policy reduces loan rates 
and boosts lending to businesses and households. In a similar study using bank level data, Demiralp 
et al. (2017) also find that banks increase lending as a reaction to NIRP. However, the latter studies 
may provide misleading inferences as the authors do not compare the differential effects of policy 
rates on bank lending behaviour in NIRP adopter and non-adopter countries.  
 
Empirical analysis of the impact of NIRP is also linked to the bank lending channel literature. 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Altunbas et al. (2017) provide evidence of the bank lending channel 
for the transmission of conventional monetary policy. Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) find that low 
short-term interest rates for an extended period soften lending standards for household and 
                                                          
46 A related literature focuses on the broader macroeconomic effects of LSAPs (e.g., Lenza et al. 2010; Baumeister 
and Benati, 2013; Fujiwara, 2004; Berkmen, 2012; Schenkelberg and Watzka, 2013; Kapetanios et al., 2012) and 
generally finds a positive—albeit often small—impact of LSAPs on output and inflation.  
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corporate loans. Jimenez et al. (2014) show that lower overnight interest rates induce less 
capitalized banks to lend to riskier firms and Jimenez et al. (2012) illustrate  that tighter monetary 
policy and deteriorating economic conditions substantially reduce lending by distressed banks. 
Agarwal et al. (2017) estimate banks’ marginal propensity to lend out of a decrease in their cost of 
funds to show that banks were reluctant to lend to riskier borrowers in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. This paper makes a significant contribution to the empirical literature on the impact 
of UMP on bank lending by focusing specifically on the effectiveness of the most recent UMP 
innovation: the adoption of negative central bank policy rates.   
 
3. Methodology and data 
 
3.1 Methodology 
 
We examine two periods and two monetary policy regimes; NIRP and traditional monetary policy, 
using a difference-in-differences methodology. This methodology has been recently used in a 
variety of banking and financial sector issues (Beck et al (2010); Calderon and Schaeck (2013); 
Berger et al. (2014); Fiordelisi et al. (2016)) and more specifically to analyse bank lending channel 
effects (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette (2015); Adams-Kane et al. (2017). The advantage of this 
approach is that it allows to use a panel data set-up to compare a treated group of banks (those 
impacted by the policy change) with those that are not affected (the control group or untreated 
banks). The approach also helps to control for the ‘omitted variable bias’47. Our baseline 
specification takes the following form:  
 
Δ𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡) + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (1) 
 
where Δ𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the growth rate of lending of bank 𝑖 in country 𝑗 at time 𝑡, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if bank 𝑖 in country 𝑗 has been affected by NIRP and 0 otherwise, 
and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after the period that country 𝑗 at time 𝑡 
                                                          
47 For example, regulatory changes (such as Basel III) may affect treated and untreated bank lending alike, regardless 
of the NIRP intervention. But as these changes may affect banks similarly, the difference-in-differences approach 
avoids this bias by differencing away common trends affecting both groups. 
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decided to implement NIRP and 0 before that period, and 𝛽3 represents the average difference in 
the change in bank lending between countries that switched to NIRP and countries that continued 
with traditional monetary policy. We also include 𝛾𝑖, and 𝜑𝑡, to capture, respectively, year and 
country fixed effects and limit the potential for bias in estimates of 𝛽348. 
 
We introduce bank- and country-specific controls in a second specification that takes the form: 
 
Δ𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  (2) 
 
where 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of time variant bank- and county-specific characteristics to capture cross-bank 
and cross-country heterogeneity over time that can affect bank lending49. Bank-specific variables 
are a combination of balance sheet and performance measures and include total assets, the ratio of 
equity to total assets, return on average equity, and the liquidity ratio. Country-specific variables 
are key measures of economic performance and include real GDP growth, consumer price 
inflation, and the rate of unemployment50.  
 
The difference-in-differences approach requires several assumptions hold. First, the control group 
must constitute a valid counterfactual for the treatment. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and 
Pearson correlation coefficient for macroeconomic variables in the treatment and control group. 
The significance of coefficients suggests that the countries in the two groups experienced a similar 
macroeconomic environment validating the fact that the control group constitutes a valid 
counterfactual scenario for the treatment.51 
 
                                                          
48 We include country-specific dummies to control for time-invariant, unobservable country characteristics that can 
shape bank lending. We include year fixed effects to control for possible shocks over the sample period that can affect 
bank lending such as other monetary policies and changes in regulation. All regressions are estimated with bank-level 
clustering, namely allowing for correlation in the error terms. We use robust standard errors to control for 
heteroscedasticity and dependence (see Bertrand et al. (2004); Petersen (2007) and Donald and Lang (2007). We also 
estimate equation 2 substituting country fixed effects with selected country control variables and bank fixed effects.   
49 According to Roberts and Whited (2012), if assignment to treatment and control groups is not random but dictated 
by an observable rule, including covariates in the difference-in-differences regression satisfies the conditional mean 
zero assumption required for unbiased estimates. 
50 Country control variables will substitute country fixed effects and used as a further robustness check to control for 
the omitted variable bias. 
51 We arbitrarily chose a longer time-period (in comparison with the sample period) to highlight that these 
macroeconomic indicators move together for several years after the GFC. 
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(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
The second is the zero correlation assumption often referred as the ‘parallel trend’ assumption52. 
Figure 1 depicts the average growth rate of gross, mortgage, and commercial and industrial loans 
from 2012 to 2016 for both NIRP adopter and non-adopter countries. The difference in the average 
growth of the three measures was constant in the pre-treatment period, indicating that the parallel 
trend assumption holds. Since June 2014, when policy rates in most of the NIRP adopter countries 
turned negative, increasing gap developed for gross, mortgage, and commercial and industrial loan 
growth rates in the treated and untreated countries. Overall, Figure 1 suggests that banks in NIRP 
adopter countries reduced their lending after the treatment period compared with NIRP non-
adopter countries.53 
 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
3.2 Data 
 
We rely on Jobst and Lin (2016) for dating the adoption of NIRP regimes and construct a dataset 
combining information from two main sources. The macroeconomic series are from Thompson 
DataStream, and the bank balance and performance data are from Orbis Bank Focus. Since Orbis 
comprises cross-country banks that operate in more than one country, balance sheet data can be 
either consolidated or unconsolidated. To avoid concerns regarding banks that operate in more 
than one country in both treated and not treated groups, we use bank account data that are either 
unconsolidated (U1 and U2 codes in Orbis) or consolidated but not with an unconsolidated 
subsidiary. Our sample covers commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks and bank 
holding companies from 33 OECD countries over 2012 - 201654, giving us a total of 23,247 
                                                          
52According to Bertrand et al. (2004) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) the difference-in-differences is valid only 
under the restrictive assumption that changes in the outcome variable (in our case bank lending) over time would have 
been exactly the same in both treatment (countries that experienced NIRP) and control groups (no NIRP) in the 
absence of the intervention (the introduction of NIRP). 
53 Further falsification tests will confirm our decision to choose a difference-in-differences methodology in our 
analysis. 
54 The sample period is intentionally short. According to Roberts and Whited (2013) and Bertrand et al. (2004) the 
change in the treatment group should be concentrated around the onset of the treatment. Moving away leads to 
unobservables and other factors that affect the treatment outcome leading to omitted variable bias threatening the 
validity of the model. 
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observations. The treated countries include those of the Euro Area, Hungary, Sweden and 
Switzerland.55 Descriptive statistics for the bank lending series, other bank balance sheet variables, 
and the macroeconomic series in the treatment and control groups of countries are shown in Table 
2.  
 
Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics for bank lending. In a recent study on monetary 
stimulus and bank lending, Chakraborty et al. (2017) find that in response to the Federal Reserve’s 
asset purchases, banks shift resources away from C&I lending into mortgage origination. To take 
this potential crowding-out effect between bank lending activities into consideration, we group 
bank lending behaviour into three types:  gross loans, mortgage loans and C&I loans. We use the 
log growth rate of gross loans; mortgage loans and commercial and industrial (C&I) loans as our 
measures of interest.  
 
Panel B of Table 2 presents summary statistics on other bank balance sheet data, including bank 
size (log(TA)), equity ratio (E/TA), profitability (ROE), liquidity ratio (liquidity), total capital ratio 
(capital), funding structure (funding_structure), and income structure (income_structure). Bank 
size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets and is used to control for different 
characteristics across relatively large and small banks. Bank lending may also be driven by other 
bank level characteristics including equity strength, profitability and liquidity condition. 
Accordingly, we control for bank equity, profitability and liquidity ratios in the regression models. 
In a recent theoretical study, Brunnermeier and Koby (2016) suggest that monetary policy may 
have unintended contractionary effects on lending due to bank capital constraints, bank business 
models and market competition. To empirically test the hypothesis of Brunnermeier and Koby 
(2016), we also include variables that account for bank funding and income structures and the 
Hirshman Herfindahl market structure index (HHI) to proxy the impact of bank competition.  
 
Furthermore, we include country GDP growth, inflation and the unemployment rate to account for 
macroeconomic heterogeneity across countries. Earlier literature also highlighted the major 
transmission channels of other UMP policies including central banks’ asset purchase programs (Di 
                                                          
55 We exclude Japan in our sample as the country only adopted NIRP in early 2016, which provides too short a period 
to examine the impact of NIRP on bank lending.  
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Maggio et. al, 2016; Rodnyanski and Darmouni, 2017; Kandrac and Schulsche, 2017; Chakraborty 
et. al, 2017). In line with Gambacorta et al. (2014), we employ the log growth rate of a country’s 
central bank balance sheet as further controls to isolate the impact of other UMP’s on bank lending 
behavior.  
 
A further issue is that bank lending may be driven by loan demand from households and corporates. 
To address this concern, we construct loan demand indices based on data from the ECB and FED 
bank lending surveys. Both of these surveys identify loan demand as the need of enterprises and 
households for bank loan financing, irrespective of whether a loan is granted or not.56 Based on 
data from these two surveys, we construct loan demand indices for the Euro area and US, focusing 
on increases or decreases in loan demand. Panel C of Table 2 presents summary statistics of 
macroeconomic conditions, monetary policy and loan demand indices.   
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Baseline results 
 
The results from estimating equations (1) and (2) are presented in Tables 3 to 5. All the estimates 
include fixed country and time effects. Table 3 reports results for estimates where the dependent 
variable is the (natural logarithm) growth rate of gross loans with control variables added 
sequentially. Our main interest is the size, sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on 𝛽3, 
which is the average difference in the change in bank lending between countries that adopted NIRP 
and countries that did not, and which we denote in the table as the NIRP-effect. The baseline result 
reported in column 1 of Table 3 excludes all control variables. The coefficient on NIRP is sizeable, 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that countries in which central 
                                                          
56 The bank lending surveys from ECB and FED are available at:  
1) https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/  
2) https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html  
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banks implemented NIRP experienced a decline in total bank lending of around 7.2% relative to 
those countries in which central banks did not follow this policy. The remaining columns of the 
table present the results from adding bank-specific controls sequentially. The baseline regression 
result holds up well in the face of all controls and the coefficient on NIRP-effect remains negative 
and significant at the 1% level in all estimates57. Of the bank-specific control variables, bank 
funding structure and profitability appear to be the major factors driving lending.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
In Tables 4 and 5 we report results from estimates for mortgage loans and C&I loans, respectively. 
As is the case for gross loans, the coefficients on NIRP-effect are all sizeable, stable, negative and 
statistically significant, including the presence of all control variables. Countries where central 
banks implemented NIRP experienced a decline in mortgage loans of around 3% relative to 
countries that pursued other monetary policies; the decline in C&I loans was  more marked, 
however, falling by almost 16%. Once again, funding structure and profitability appear to be the 
main bank-specific factor driving C&I and mortgage loan growth58. 
 
(Insert Table 4&5 here) 
 
 
4.2 Robustness tests 
 
In this section, we report results from a range of robustness checks that offer variations from our 
choice of controls used in the baseline model. NIRP was brought into the UMP mix by central 
banks several years after the adoption of other unconventional monetary policies, most particularly 
extensive outright asset purchases, and it is important to disentangle the effects of NIRP on lending 
from the effects of these policies. Outright asset purchases were aimed at expanding the central 
bank’s balance sheet to increase the level of the monetary base in order to boost  nominal spending 
                                                          
57 Small variation in the treatment coefficient is an essential prerequisite for the difference-in-differences estimation. 
58 We control for the omitted variable bias by replacing country fixed effects with selected macroeconomic variables 
(GDP growth, consumer price index and unemployment) as well as with bank fixed effects. The results are reported 
in Tables A2, A3 and A4 in the Appendix. The NIRP-Effect coefficient is negative and statistically significant. 
However, the coefficient displays larger variation with respect to the addition of country controls. This suggests that 
country fixed effects are better able to capture unobservable factors than the set of country control variables. 
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(Bernanke and Reinhart 2004). We proxy for the use of other UMPs by including a variable that 
takes account of central bank balance sheet size. Results reported in panel A of Table 6 are for 
each of the three categories of bank lending. The results including the log growth rate of the size 
of central bank balance sheets are reported in columns 1, 2 and 3 suggest that NIRP and central 
bank assets purchases had the opposite impact on bank lending. Thus, estimates suggest that 
central banks that introduced NIRP to boost lending undermined other aspects of UMP that had 
the same objective. 
 
Our second robustness check aims to control for the effect of credit demand on bank lending 
behavior. To this end, we make use of indicators of loan demand from the U.S Federal Reserve 
Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices and the ECB’s Euro Area 
Bank Lending Survey, both of which have elements focused on the need of firms and households 
for bank loan financing (irrespective of whether the loan is granted). We construct monthly credit 
demand indices from the aforementioned ECB and Federal Reserve surveys. These results are 
reported in columns 1, 2 and 3 of panel B where the coefficient on NIRP remain negative and 
statistically significant. The results demonstrate that the negative relationship between NIRP and 
bank lending is not driven by loan demand.  
 
For a third robustness check, we alter our country sample where the treatment group includes only 
European countries so the control group includes only European non-NIRP adopters.  These results 
are reported in panel C of the table. The coefficients on NIRP in the cases of gross loans and 
mortgage loans remain negative and statistically significant, though somewhat smaller than in the 
baseline case, but for C&I lending the coefficient is no longer significant59.  
 
As a final robustness test, we try to eliminate the possibility that bank behavior in the treatment 
group may have altered prior to the introduction of NIRP—for example, in anticipation of adverse 
effects of NIRP, or for some bank-specific reason—thereby invalidating our choice of difference-
in-differences estimation. We model false NIRP periods for 2012 and 2013. If the estimated 
                                                          
59 We follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) that use different control groups, 
as a further test to control for the omitted variables problem. Multiple control and treatment groups reduce biases 
and unobservable variables associated with just one comparison. 
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coefficients on the ‘false’ NIRP are not statistically significant or negative, we can be more 
confident that our baseline coefficient is capturing a genuine monetary policy shock. In panel D 
and E of the table we report the results .The coefficients on the NIRP variable in 2013 are all 
positive and statistically significant in the cases of total loans and C&I loans, and positive and 
insignificant in the case of mortgage loans adding further support to the validity of our baseline 
results. Again, the 2012 falsification test shows positive coefficients (although not significant) 
indicating an increase in lending in the treatment groups when compared with the control. The 
results also reaffirm and strengthen the parallel trend assumption further lending support to the 
conclusion that differential bank lending behavior is driven by NIRP.  
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
4.3 NIRP and the reverse interest rate hypothesis 
 
In this section, we report results from a test of aspects of the Brunnemeier and Koby (2016) 
‘reversal rate hypothesis’ within a difference-in-differences framework by creating NIRP-adopter 
treatment groups and non-adopter control groups according to whether banks meet representations 
of bank-specific factors that these authors suggest might reduce bank lending in a low interest rate 
setting60. Specifically, we focus on banks’ capitalization, funding structure, business model, 
interest rate exposure, and competitive conditions in the banking market. First, we examine the 
impact of bank capital on lending by grouping banks in the treatment and control groups according 
to whether they have total capital ratios above or below the median for banks in our sample, 
labelling banks with higher than median capital ratios as ‘well-capitalized’ and those below the 
median as ‘under-capitalized. The results for the different categories of loans are reported in panels 
A and B of Table 7.  The coefficients on NIRP for gross and business loans are negative and 
statistically significant in both sets of estimates but suggest a substantially larger decline in lending 
by under-capitalized banks after the introduction of NIRP. For mortgage loans the coefficient of 
well-capitalized banks loses significance indicating that above median capitalised banks do not 
reduce lending after NIRP. Specifically, banks with capital below the median reduced gross loans, 
                                                          
60 As already mentioned in section 4.2, splitting control and treatment groups in different sub-groups allows us also to 
reduce bias and unobservable variables associated with just one comparison. 
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mortgage, and business loans by 7.4%, 3.9% and 9.42% more in comparison to banks with above 
median capital. This is consistent with the Brunnemeier and Koby (2016) assertion that suggests 
that in situations of economic uncertainty and changing regulation, binding capital requirements 
can limit the pass-through of accommodative monetary policies to bank lending61. Second, we 
consider how NIRP interacts with bank funding structure. We distinguish between retail deposit-
based and wholesale deposit-based banks on the assumption that if interest rates on retail deposits 
are more downwards sticky then the introduction of NIRP would likely pose greater limitations on 
retail deposit-based banks to increase lending.62 This is confirmed by the results reported in panels 
C and D of table 7, where the coefficients on NIRP are highly significant in both sets of estimates 
but indicate that NIRP resulted in a markedly larger decline in lending by retail deposit-based 
banks. The result is consistent with the argument of Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) that NIRP enabled 
wholesale-funded banks to take greater advantage of the decline in funding costs and provide more 
loans.  
 
We assess the impact of banks’ business models on lending in a NIRP context by distinguishing 
between traditional interest-dependent banks from those that have a more fee-dependent business 
model. For our purposes, a bank is defined as interest-dependent if the interest earnings share of 
total earnings is above the median for banks in our sample; banks are deemed to be fee-based if 
their interest earnings share is below the median. If interest rates on retail deposits are sticky 
downwards then the introduction of NIRP would likely pose more constraints for banks with 
interest-dependent than fee-dependent business models. The results from these estimates are 
reported in panels E and F of the table and show that banks whose business model is mainly 
interest-based reduced their lending by more than banks whose business model was more fees 
orientated. In the case of gross lending, for example, the effect of NIRP in reducing lending by 
interest-dependent banks was about twice that compared to fee-based banks.   
 
Our final test of the Brunnemeier and Koby (2016) hypothesis is to assess the impact of NIRP on 
lending in the context of competitive conditions in banking markets. In this case, we proxy market 
                                                          
61 These results are also in-line with Carlson et al. (2013) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004). Both studies show 
the importance of capital as a buffer against monetary policy shocks on lending. 
62 For this exercise, we consider as retail deposit banks those with retail deposits greater that 50% of total liabilities. 
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competition by focusing on market concentration in each country as indicated by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). Sørensen and Werner (2006), for example, use the concentration ratio as 
a proxy for competition and conclude that banks operating in a less competitive environment make 
slower adjustments to interest rates (and therefore to net interest margins), which slows the 
transmission of monetary policy changes to bank lending.63 We define markets as competitive with 
a HHI value below 1000 (the median value in our sample) and split the sample for the treatment 
and control groups. According to Brunnemeier and Koby (2016) low interest policy is likely to 
have a more limiting effect on bank lending in competitive markets because of the associated 
pressure on net interest margins. The results reported in panels G and H of table 7 support this 
view: the impact of NIRP on bank lending in competitive markets is negative and statistically 
significant for each category of lending, suggesting that banks in these markets have little option 
but to generate alternative income from other sources to maintain profitability. In more 
concentrated markets in contrast, the impact of NIRP is positive and statistically significant in the 
case of gross loans suggesting that banks in these markets are better able to maintain profitability 
and interest margins. 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Since 2012, several central banks have adopted NIRP aimed at boosting real spending by 
facilitating an increase in the supply and demand for loans. The policy has generated controversy 
with skeptics pointing to several factors that might complicate the transmission from negative 
policy rates to higher bank lending. Empirical evidence on the impact of the policy is scant. 
However, in this paper, we provide new evidence that bank lending fared worse in NIRP-adopter 
countries than it did in countries that did not adopt the policy. Specifically, countries in which 
                                                          
63The US Department of Justice ‘generally consider markets in which the HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500 points to 
be moderately concentrated, and consider markets in which the HHI is in excess of 2,500 points to be highly 
concentrated’. https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index. We recognize that there are shortcomings 
with using the HHI as a proxy for competitive conditions. There are different views about competition and 
concentration in the literature, Claessens and Laeven (2003), for example, point out that there are some countries, such 
as USA, that show levels of monopolistic competition in banking despite the large number of banks, while countries 
like Canada are highly competitive, although the number of banks is relatively small. For this reason we also cross-
checked using Boone and Lerner indicators. Their estimations are available upon request.   
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central banks implemented NIRP experienced a decline in total bank lending relative to those 
countries in which central banks did not follow this policy. This result holds for gross bank lending 
and separately for mortgage and C&I lending, the key categories of bank lending, and is robust to 
the inclusion of several bank-specific control variables. It  also stands up in the face of a wide array 
of robustness checks, including controlling for the effects of other aspects of UMP, developments 
in loan demand across countries,  for possible bank funding constraints, , and to  (possibile) 
changes in bank behavior prior to the introduction of NIRP. Finally, our results are relevant to the 
validity of the ‘reverse interest rate hypothesis’ developed recently by Brunnemeier and Koby 
(2016) in that bank-specific factors (capitalization, funding structure, business model, interest rate 
exposure, competitive conditions) appear to reduce banks’ willingness to lend in a  negative 
interest rate setting.  
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Figure 1. Parallel Trend Assumption 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Macroeconomics 
Indicators and Pearson Correlation Test in the 
Control and Treatment Group during the Period 
2007-2016. 
           
Variable Mean Control Mean Treatment Std.Dev. Control Std.Dev. Treatment Pearson Corr. 
      
Unemployment 7.38 7.54 1.86 3.70 0.6978* 
     
 
GDP 0.35 0.19 0.47 0.64 0.9021*** 
     
 
Inflation 2.04 1.47 1.53 1.22 0.8659*** 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics: treatment and control groups 
 
I. Treatment group:  II. Control group 
             
Variable Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max   
Panel A: Bank Lending            
GL_GR 7543 -0.04 0.41 -9.73 8.54  15704 0.03 0.45 -10.17 7.31   
MORT_GR 3795 -0.03 0.39 -7.00 7.90  5938 0.02 0.50 -9.13 7.71   
CL_GR 3259 -0.11 0.54 -6.96 4.83  8018 0.02 0.61 -8.25 6.76   
              
Panel B: Bank Balance Sheet  Data            
Log(TA) 8138 13.77 2.12 3.94 21.72  18700 14.07 2.38 2.95 21.90   
E/TA 8136 10.48% 5.71% 3.83% 24.93%  17703 11.74% 6.56% 3.83% 24.93%   
ROE 8099 4.56% 4.40% 0.00% 16.83%  18261 6.27% 5.18% 0.00% 16.83%   
Liquidity 7895 21.76% 15.12% 0.90% 46.94%  17264 20.67% 15.44% 0.90% 46.94%   
Capital 5700 18.38% 4.57% 11.00% 26.30%  11302 17.40% 4.59% 11.00% 26.30%   
Income_Structure 7881 6.67% 5.69% 0.00% 16.99%  18261 4.97% 5.05% 0.00% 16.99%   
Funding_Structure 7465 64.61% 20.30% 20.40% 85.32%  14752 65.06% 20.98% 20.40% 85.32%   
HHI 10092 855 536 453 3777  56608 446 397 249 4237   
              
Panel C: Macroeconomic Conditions and Monetary Policy          
GDP growth 10092 0.41% 0.66% -0.19% 6.62%  56604 0.44% 0.28% -1.13% 1.89%   
Inflation 10092 0.43% 0.77% -1.73% 4.39%  56608 1.51% 1.14% -1.73% 8.93%   
Unemployment 4978 7.91% 4.71% 4.50% 26.30%  45047 7.34% 2.51% 3.1% 27.20%   
CB_GR 5700 -0.02 0.15 -0.41 0.35  46991 0.09 0.16 -0.66 0.45   
M0_GR 6588 8.07 10.17 -4.55 20.12  51648 9.51 9.22 -26.63 51.56   
Deposit Rate 1962 0.5% 0.57% -0.18% 1.41%  5512 3.38% 4.83% 0.03% 16.77%   
Loan Demand 8360 15.74 13.85 -22.92 48.33  46772 10.40 16.00 -68.33 23.10   
              
 
Note:  GL_GR is the yearly logarithm growth rate of loans plus  loan-loss reserves; MORT_GR is the yearly logarithm growth rate 
of mortgage loans; CL_GR is the yearly logarithm growth rate of commercial and industrial loans; Log(TA) is the natural logarithm 
of bank total asset; E/TA is the ratio of bank equity to total assets; ROE is the ratio of bank pre-tax profits to total equity; Liquidity 
is the ratio of bank liquid asset to total assets; Capital is bank’s total capital ratio; Income_Structure is the ratio of bank interest 
income to total income; Funding_Structure is the ratio of bank deposit funding to total liabilities; HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index; GDP_GR is the yearly growth rate of real GDP; Inflation is the yearly Consumer Price Index in percentage; Unemployment 
is the rate of yearly unemployment in percentage; CB_GR is the monthly logarithm growth rate of central bank balance sheet size; 
M0_GR is the logarithm growth rate of the money supply  M0; Deposit Rate is the country level aggregate deposit rate in 
percentage; Loan Demand is the monthly credit demand indices constructed from data from ECB and Federal Reserve loan demand 
surveys.    
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Table 3. Baseline regressions: NIRP and total gross lending 
 
All regressions include fixed country and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
             
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NIRP-Effect -0.0719*** -0.0719*** -0.0720*** -0.0810*** -0.0821*** -0.0839*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0040) 
Log(TA)  0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0010** -0.0009* 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
E\TA   -0.0007*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 
   (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Funding_structure    0.0224*** 0.0220*** 0.0233*** 
    (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) 
ROE     0.0031*** 0.0032*** 
     (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Liquidity      0.0102 
      (0.0066) 
       
Year-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.24 0.24 0.241 0.2823 0.2863 0.2926 
N.Banks 6558 6552 6551 5883 5869 5783 
N.Obs 23247 23237 23233 20905 20829 20481 
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Table 4. Baseline Regression: NIRP and total mortgage loans  
 
All regressions include fixed country and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NIRP-Effect -0.0302*** -0.0302*** -0.0299*** -0.0396*** -0.0389*** -0.0374*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0090) 
Log(TA)  0.0007 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
E\TA   -0.0014*** -0.0010** -0.0007 -0.0011** 
   (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Funding_structure    0.0054 0.0025 0.0010 
    (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0116) 
ROE     0.0023*** 0.0024*** 
     (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Liquidity      -0.0167 
      (0.0118) 
       
Year-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.246 0.247 0.247 0.2566 0.2577 0.2579 
N.Banks 2740 2740 2740 2673 2672 2663 
N.Obs 9733 9732 9730 9510 9503 9454 
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Table 5. Baseline Regressions: NIRP and C&I loans  
 
 
All regressions include fixed country and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NIRP-Effect -0.1550*** -0.1550*** -0.1540*** -0.1590*** -0.1590*** -0.1590*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0091) 
Log(TA)  0.0071*** 0.0066*** 0.0074*** 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 
  (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
E\TA   -0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 
   (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Funding_structure    0.0483*** 0.0459*** 0.0473*** 
    (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
ROE     0.0021*** 0.0020*** 
     (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Liquidity      0.0117 
      (0.0180) 
       
Year-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.0624 0.0627 0.0625 0.0638 0.0647 0.0652 
N.Banks 3220 3220 3220 3045 3044 3032 
N.Obs 11277 11277 11275 10688 10677 10626 
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Table 6. Robustness checks  
        
  GL_GR ML_GR CL_GR 
  (1) (2) (3) 
A. Monetary Policy    
   NIRP-effect -0.0615*** -0.0137 -0.1313*** 
 
(0.0040) (0.0091) (0.0095) 
    CB_GR 
   
0.0947*** 0.0584*** 0.0286 
(0.0081) (0.0183) (0.0204) 
    
    Adjusted R2 0.2546 0.258 0.0662 
    No. of banks 6530 2723 3201 
    N. Obs 22505 9539 10659 
B. Credit demand    
    NIRP-effect -0.1491*** -0.9170*** -0.2273*** 
 
(0.0044) (0.0151) (0.0108) 
    
    Loan_Demand 0.0086*** 0.0023 -0.0045 
 (0.0013) (0.0039) (0.0032) 
       
    Adjusted R2 0.4025 0.2585 0.0804 
    No. of banks 3719 1947 2349 
    N. Obs 11119 6840 8331 
C. NIRP and the EU    
    NIRP-effect -0.0267*** -0.0530*** 0.0268 
 (0.0066) (0.0128) (0.0164) 
 
  
 
    Adjusted R2 0.2911 0.34 0.07 
    No. of banks 5008 2282 2122 
    N. Obs 17978 8264 7558 
D.  I° Falsification tests – ‘fake’ 
NIRP  
  
 NIRP-effect 2013 0.0176*** 0.0119 0.0923*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0138) (0.0142) 
    
    Adjusted R2 0.1905 0.0219 0.0325 
    No. of banks 6317 2651 3240 
    N. Obs 23199 9673 11346 
E. II° Falsification tests – ‘fake’ 
NIRP  
  
     NIRP-effect 
2012 
0.0075 0.01600 0.0007 
 (0.0053) (0.0110 (0.0129) 
    
    Adjusted R2 0.2649 0.3628 0.0177 
    No. of banks 5991 2493 2980 
    N. Obs 11230 4701 5528 
All regressions include fixed country and time effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7. NIRP and bank lending, bank capitalization, funding structure and business model  
 
 GL_GR ML_GR 
 
CL_GR 
A. Undercapitalized    
    NIRP-effect 
 
-0.1178*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.0542*** 
(0.0124) 
-0.1852*** 
(0.0121) 
    Adjusted R2 0.3729 0.2763 0.0912 
    No. of banks 2909 1355 1742 
    No. of observations 8050 3788 
4869 
B. Well-capitalized    
    NIRP-effect 
 
-0.0430*** 
(0.0076) 
-0.0152 
(0.0191) 
-0.0910*** 
(0.0168) 
    Adjusted R2 0.2657 0.2231 0.0427 
    No. of banks 2870 1329 1571 
    No. of observations 7661 3638 4279 
C. Wholesale deposit-based    
    NIRP-effect 
 
-0.0702*** 
(0.0145) 
-0.0196 
(0.0152) 
-0.1314*** 
(0.0335) 
    Adjusted R2 0.0831 0.2200 0.0367 
    No. of banks 1095 534 275 
    No. of observations 3239 1482 756 
D. Retail deposit-based    
    NIRP-effect 
 
-0.0853*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.0455*** 
(0.0103) 
-0.1700*** 
(0.0100) 
    Adjusted R2 0.3848 0.2762 0.0673 
    No. of banks 4389 2367 2600 
    No. of observations 14704 8245 8967 
E. Fee-based    
    NIRP-effect 
 
-0.0381*** 
(0.0117) 
-0.0082 
(0.0337) 
-0.1577*** 
(0.0364) 
    Adjusted R2 0.04 0.06 0.03 
    No. of banks 2063 327 582 
    No. of observations 4590 626 1178 
F. Interest earnings-based    
    NIRP-effect 
 
-0.0833*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0466*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.1819*** 
(0.0178) 
    Adjusted R2 0.40 0.32 0.0618 
    No. of banks 5766 2624 2094 
    No. of observations 18657 9107 6205 
G. Competitive markets    
    NIRP-effect 
 
-0.0998*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0495*** 
(0.0103) 
-0.1880*** 
(0.0092) 
    Adjusted R2 0.2827 0.2516 0.0716 
    No. of banks 5191 2302 2716 
    No. of observations 17644 7837 9777 
H. Concentrated markets    
    NIRP-effect 
 
0.02777*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0030 
(0.0154) 
0.0239 
(0.0234) 
    Adjusted R2 0.1877 0.2763 0.0800 
    No. of banks 1728 673 515 
    No. of observations 5603 1896 1500 
All regressions include fixed bank and time effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A1. Time of Adoption of NIRP.  
  
Country NIRP adoption date 
Austria June 2014            
Belgium June 2014   
Denmark July 2012   
Estonia June 2014   
Finland June 2014   
France June 2014   
Germany June 2014   
Greece June 2014   
Hungary March 2014   
Ireland June 2014   
Italy June 2014   
Luxembourg June 2014   
Netherlands June 2014   
Norway September 2015   
Portugal June 2014   
Slovakia June 2014   
Slovenia June 2014   
Spain June 2014   
Sweden February 2015   
Switzerland January 2015   
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Table A2: Baseline regressions: NIRP and total gross lending 
 
All regressions include fixed bank and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(8) 
NIRP-effect -0.0738*** -0.0677*** -0.0675*** -0.0728*** -0.0664*** -0.0695*** -0.0692*** -0.0726*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0064) 
(0.0068) 
Log(TA)  0.0571*** 0.0624*** -0.0000 0.0632*** 0.06683***  
0.0076 
  (0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0004) (0.0089) (0.0093)  
(0.0146) 
E/TA   0.0014 -0.0000 0.0010 0.0015*  
0.0024* 
   (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0009)  
(0.0013) 
Funding_Structure    -0.0007*** 0.0000 0.0001  
0.0001 
    (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)  
(0.0005) 
ROE     0.0016*** 0.0016***  
0.0012*** 
     (0.0004) (0.0004)  
(0.0006) 
Liquidity      0.0004  
0.0011*** 
      (0.0003)  
(0.0004) 
GDP_GR       -0.0269*** 
-0.0378*** 
       (0.0104) 
(0.1072) 
Inflation       -0.0007 -0.0023 
       (00021.) 
(0.0021) 
Unemployment       -0.0206*** 
-0.0229*** 
       (0.0037) 
(0.0038) 
Adjusted R2 0.267 0.270 0.271 0.201 0.282 0.294 0.273 0.302 
No. of banks 6558 6552 6551 6426 6423 6260 6130 5582 
No. of observations 23247 23237 23233 22577 22556 21881 17749 
 
16666 
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Table A3. Baseline Regression: NIRP and total mortgage loans  
 
All regressions include fixed bank and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(8) 
NIRP-effect -0.0376*** -0.0264*** -0.0262*** -0.0335*** -0.0270*** -0.0256*** -0.0182* -0.0186* 
 (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.064) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.010) 
(0.0112) 
Log(TA)  0.0955*** 0.0911*** -0.0002 0.0911*** 0.1063***  
-0.0078 
  (0.0150) (0.0153) (0.0007) (0.0158) (0.0166)  
(0.0283) 
E/TA   -0.0020 -0.0015*** -0.0024 -0.0014  
-0.0018 
   (0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0019) (0.0019)  
(0.0033) 
Funding_Structure    -0.0007*** 0.0008 0.0008  
0.0008 
    (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0007)  
(0.0010) 
ROE     0.0014 0.0013  
0.0001 
     (0.0009) (0.0009)  
(0.0013) 
Liquidity      0.0003  
0.0006 
      (0.0005)  
(0.0007) 
GDP_GR       0.0904*** 
0.0936)*** 
       (0.0208) 
(0.0215) 
Inflation       0.0023 
0.0034 
       (0.0047) 
(0.0048) 
Unemployment       -0.0260*** 
-0.0281*** 
       (0.0073) 
(0.0075) 
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.290 0.290 0.186 0.292 0.290 0.290 0.295 
No. of banks 2740 2740 2740 2703 2703 2689 2556 2506 
No. of observa6ions 9732 9732 9730 9535 9533 9468 7364 
 
7160 
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Table A4. Baseline Regressions: NIRP and C&I loans  
 
All regressions include fixed bank and time effects. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NIRP-effect -0.1535*** -0.1343*** -0.1349*** -0.1494*** -0.1317*** -0.1324*** -0.1474*** 
-0.1400*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0083) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0185) (0.0198) 
Log(TA)  0.1362*** 0.1534*** 0.0047*** 0.1560*** 0.1626***  
0.0561 
  (0.0273) (0.0272) (0.0012) (0.0276) (0.0273)  (0.0447) 
E/TA   0.0060*** 0.0009* 0.0058** 0.0050*  0.0047 
   (0.0026) (0.0005) (0.0027) (0.0028)  (0.0041) 
Funding_Structure    -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0009  -0.0007 
    (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0014)  (0.0018) 
ROE     0.0024* 0.0029**  0.0031 
     (0.0014) (0.0014)  (0.0019) 
Liquidity      0.0018**  0.0025** 
      (0.0009)  (0.0013) 
GDP_GR       0.0816*** 0.1042*** 
       (0.0363) (0.0376) 
Inflation       0.0084 0.0149 
       (0.0128) (0.0137) 
Unemployment       -0.0259*** -0.0246*** 
       (0.0098) (0.0103) 
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.076 0.0764 0.215 0.078 0.079 0.067 0.070 
No. of banks 3220 3220 3220 3170 3169 3142 2999 2924 
No. of observations 11277 11277 11275 11006 10999 10886 8547 
 
8245 
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CHAPTER 4 
Understanding Banks’ Sovereign Exposures: Do Balance Sheet Conditions Matter? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the influence of bank balance sheet conditions on the size and riskiness 
of sovereign bond holding. Using a newly combined dataset of European banks, we find that 
banks that are small, less capitalised, more profitable, more liquid, with high non-performing 
loans and limited lending hold more and riskier sovereign securities. While European and 
domestic sovereign exposure show similar results, different bank balance sheet features drive 
the exposure towards (higher risk) GIIPS and (lower risk) CORE countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL: E43, E44, E52, G21, F34 
Keywords: Sovereign exposure, balance sheet characteristics, bond portfolio size, bond 
portfolio risk 
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1. Introduction 
 
Historically, it has long been recognised that the well-being of banks and governments are 
mutually dependent (Ferguson, 2008; Calomiris and Haber, 2014). Yet, despite this view 
developed countries did not experience any major adverse shifts in sovereign credit risk  until 
the events of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (Acharya et al. 2014). Since the GFC and the 
following Sovereign Debt Crisis (SDC) banks’ exposure toward sovereign debt has been at the 
centre of a vigorous academic and policy debate. Despite an initial phase of fire sales of risky 
assets and ‘flight to safety’ effect, exposure to sovereign debt grew considerably (figure 1) 
raising concerns about the potential negative effects on banks’ balance sheets. This has 
promoted a substantial investigation into the motives of banks’ bonds holding behaviour and 
their implications for financial stability. According to BIS (2011) and Davis and Ng (2011), 
sovereign credit risk can hurt banks’ balance sheet in several ways. First, losses on holdings of 
government securities can weaken banks’ balance sheets, raising riskiness and funding costs. 
This in-turn can impair lending and consequently economic growth (Gennaioli et al. 2016). 
Second, high sovereign risk reduces the collateral value that banks can use to raise wholesale 
funding on the interbank market64. Third, sovereign downgrades are generally accompanied by 
lower rating for domestic banks. This leads to both an increase in funding costs and limited 
market access to liquidity. Finally, sovereign risk reduces the funding benefits that banks derive 
from implicit and explicit government guarantees. These factors may provoke spill over (or 
‘contagion’) effects to banks in other countries either directly (through direct exposure to 
distressed foreign sovereigns) or indirectly (through cross border interbank exposure) 
threatening bank systemic risk. Hence, understanding the determinants of the size and riskiness 
of bank’s bond holding portfolios is a crucial factor for financial stability. 
On one hand, a large literature (Diamond and Rajan, 2011; Garcia and Gimeno, 2014; Ongena 
et al. 2015; Acharya and Steffen, 2015; Altavilla et al. 2016; Gennaioli et al. 2016; 
Brunnermeier et al. 2016) has adopted a macroeconomic approach to investigate the 
determinants of the size and risk of sovereign debt exposure and the different behaviour among 
banks operating in distressed and non-distressed countries during the crisis65. On the other 
hand, the microeconomic approach (Affinito et al. 2016; Buch et al. 2016) suggests that banks 
                                                          
64 This problem has been minimized by central bank liquidity interventions.  
65 The macroeconomic approach will be analysed in detail in the next section.  
92 
 
purchase sovereign debts based on their own economic convenience (economic convenience 
hypothesis) and balance sheet conditions that can be explained by different factors. First, 
prudential regulation favours sovereign debt over loans as it assigns neither capital charges 
(zero-risk-weights) nor portfolio concentration limits. As suggested by Popov and Van Horen 
(2015), the preferred regulatory treatment can largely explain the size and direction of 
sovereign bonds holding. In this regard, banks with low capital ratios may increase return on 
equity by shifting from low to high yielding sovereigns without altering regulatory capital 
requirements (see Acharya and Steffen, 2015). Second, banks demand and use government 
bonds as a store of liquidity and for precautionary reasons (Bolton and Jeanne, 2011; Gennaioli 
et al. 2014)66. Third, in a period with slow economic recovery, historically high levels of non-
performing loans, increasing loan loss provisions and low interest rates, sovereign debt can act 
as a substitute for credit affecting banks’ lending decision (Altavilla et al. 2016). The same 
reasons can negatively affect bank profitability suggesting that banks may have an incentive to 
purchase high yield sovereign debt securities to improve profitability conditions (carry trade 
hypothesis)67. Finally, banks with different size and business models can have a different 
appetite for holding sovereign bonds rather than other financial assets (Buch et al. 2016).   
In this study, we follow the microeconomic approach as it allows us to explore the 
aforementioned factors that can explain banks’ economic convenience to hold sovereign debt 
securities. In particular, we focus on bank balance sheet characteristics that can shape the size 
and riskiness of sovereign bond holdings. By employing a newly combined dataset of European 
banks across the period 2010-2015, we find that banks that are small, less capitalised, more 
profitable, more liquid, with high non-performing loans and limited lending hold more and 
riskier sovereign securities. Finally, while European and domestic sovereign exposure show 
similar results, different bank balance sheet features drive the exposure towards (higher risk) 
GIIPS and (lower risk) CORE countries68.  
                                                          
66 In this contest, the new Basel III’s liquidity measures can be another factor influencing sovereign bond demand 
(see Bonner, 2015).  
67 Several recent studies (Borio et al. 2015; Claessens et al. 2017; Molyneux et al. 2018) show that protracted 
periods of low and negative rates can hurt bank profitability through the compression of banks’ net interest margin. 
While low rates can negatively influence banks’ net interest income, they can boost bank profits through valuation 
gains of fixed income securities and via fees and commissions. Hence, banks can reshuffle their bond  portfolios 
by expanding the amount of available for sale and for trading securities.  
68 Following Altavilla et al. 2016, we define CORE countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Malta) as those that were stable during the SDC and GIIPS 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain as well as Cyprus and Slovenia) as vulnerable countries. 
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The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 reviews the academic literature on sovereign bonds 
exposure. Section 3 introduces our data and methodology. Section 4 presents our results along 
with several robustness checks and the final section concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review  
Our study is based on the literature that analyses, from a micro-perspective, the effect of bank 
balance sheet conditions (or economic convenience) on the size and riskiness of sovereign bond 
exposures. While there is an extensive macro-perspective literature that studies the 
determinants of sovereign bonds holding during different phases of the crisis, the micro-
perspective literature is still limited. The macro-perspective view is mostly based on the 
following hypotheses: flight to quality, moral suasion, home bias, regulatory arbitrage and risk 
shifting.  
Garcia and Gimeno (2014) show a ‘flight to quality’ effect during the sovereign debt crisis. 
Using the liquidity premia in the three major euro area sovereign bond markets (Germany, 
France and Spain) over the period 2008-2013,the authors divided the ‘flight to quality’ into a 
‘flight to safety’ and a ‘flight to liquidity’ effect suggesting that banks recompose their bond 
portfolios according to the latter rather than the former. The result is confirmed by Beber et al 
(2009) who find that even before the financial and debt crisis in times of market distress, 
investors demand sovereign bonds for their liquidity rather than credit quality. Liquidity 
reasons is also the core explanation of the theoretical model developed by Gennaioli et al. 
(2014). The authors suggest that domestic banks decide to hold large amount of sovereign debt 
as store of liquidity.  
Ongena et al. (2016) argue that during the crisis banks headquartered in distressed countries 
increase the purchase of domestic sovereign bonds because of the pressure they received from 
their governments. This effect, called “moral suasion”69, determined the large sovereign debt 
growth in banks’ portfolio over 2010-2012. Moral suasion has been evidence also by Becker 
and Ivashina (2017). Using a sample of European banks over the period 2010-2015, they find 
that politically connected and state-owned banks extended less loans to large firms during the 
crisis. This reflects a form of financial repression and misallocation of private capital 
                                                          
69 The authors define moral suasion as: “an appeal to “morality” or “patriotic duty” to induce behaviour by the 
persuaded entity that is not necessary profit maximizing for it”.  
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information. Using data of the largest European banking groups over the period 2010-2013, 
Horvath et al. (2015) show a possible home bias problem in European banks’ sovereign debt 
portfolios. When the sovereign is risky, shareholder rights strong and the bank is state-owned, 
domestic exposure is higher suggesting that home bias is driven by moral suasion. In a similar 
fashion, De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016) find that government owned banks and banks with 
politicians on the board of directors display higher home bias than privately owned banks over 
the period 2010-2013. This finding is again in-line with the moral suasion hypothesis.  
Extensive is also the literature (both theoretical and empirical) that studies the nexus between 
sovereign debt exposures and bank risk-shifting behaviour during the crisis. Acharya et al. 
(2014), Uhlig (2013), Farhi and Tirole (2014) and Broner et al. (2014) present models where 
domestic banks risk-shift their exposure toward risky domestic sovereign debt in an attempt to 
be bailed out in case of default. Acharya and Steffen (2015) indicate that GIIPS and in 
particular non-GIIPS banks engaged in carry trade during the GFC and the SDC,  promoted by 
favourable regulatory arbitrage and the ECB’s long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) . 
Banks that are undercapitalised, with high risk-weighted adjusted assets and a short-term 
funding structure risk-shifted their exposure toward risky sovereign bonds70. Similarly, 
Drechsel et al. (2015), using bank-level data over the period 2007-2011, show that banks 
located in both stressed and non-stressed countries engage in risk shifting. Again, this effect is 
stronger for weakly capitalised banks. Battistini et al (2014), exploring CDS spreads and yield 
differentials in 15 European countries over the period 2007-2013, point out that peripheral 
banks increased sovereign securities holding in response to raising domestic bond yields 
suggesting possible risk-shifting behaviour. 
A recent literature focuses on the degree of substitutability between sovereigns and lending. In 
this regard, Altavilla et al. (2016), using Italian bank-level data over the period 2007-2015, 
suggest that balance sheet characteristics such as the amount of loans or bank capital position 
affect sovereign bonds purchase. Specifically, weakly capitalised banks and banks operating in 
distressed countries during the crisis curtail lending more than less exposed banks. Popov and 
Van Horen (2015) also show that preferred regulatory treatment led to both an excessive 
increase in sovereign holdings and contraction in lending (syndicated lending), with the latter 
being stronger for GIIPS banks. Finally, Gennaioli et al. (2014), analysing 20,000 banks in 191 
                                                          
70 They find that also moral suasion and home bias determine carry trade behaviour. 
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countries and 20 sovereign defaults over the period 1998-2012, find that bond holdings 
correlate negatively with lending during sovereign defaults71. 
The microeconomic approach (or economic convenience hypothesis) has received much less 
attention. Two studies appear to have addressed this issue so far. Affinito et al. (2016) argue 
that balance sheet conditions do matter for sovereign bonds purchase. Studying the 
determinants of bond purchases in the Italian banking sector over the period 2007-2013, they 
suggest that liquidity, convenience in term of capital charges (preferred regulatory treatment) 
and high yields make sovereigns well suited to satisfy banks’ need during period of low 
profitability and credit quality. Using German bank-level data over 2005-2012, Buch et al. 
(2016) find that large, less well-capitalised and more capital markets based banks hold more 
sovereigns.  
Our contribution to the literature is important in four respects. First, as outlined previously, the 
micro-perspective literature that analyses the role of banks’ balance sheet conditions on the 
size and riskiness of sovereign bonds holding is still limited and deserve further examination 
as sovereign credit risk can hurt banks’ balance sheet in different ways (BIS, 2011; Davis and 
Ng, 2011). Second, both Affinito et al. (2016) and Buch et al. (2016) use bank-level data but 
they limit the analysis to one country (Italy and Germany, respectively). By employing detailed 
data taken from the European Banking Authority (EBA), we are able to capture cross-country 
heterogeneity and to extend the analysis on the determinants of sovereign bond holdings 
incorporating different banks in different European countries72. Third, while the majority of 
the aforementioned literature is mostly focused around the crisis period, we prolong the sample 
period to 2015 in order to provide a clear picture of the bank balance sheet conditions that can 
shape riskiness and size of sovereigns holding. Finally, contrary to the literature that uses 
mostly CDS spread to calculate the riskiness of sovereign bonds holding (Buch et al. 2016; 
Andreeva and Vlassopoulos, 2016; Acharya et al. 2014; Alter and Shuler, 2012; Alter and 
Beyer, 2014) we build a new risk-weighted measure of bond portfolios.  
                                                          
71 The hypotheses are summarize and graphically displayed in figure A1 and A2 in the Appendix. As shown, 
GIIPS banks engage in ‘flight to quality’ behaviour at the beginning of the crisis (figure A1). However, since 
2011 they received both pressure from governments (“moral suasion”) and incentives to risk-shift. This led to a 
substantial increase in sovereigns purchase. After 2013 GIIPS banks behaviour is less clear. CORE banks’ ‘flight 
to quality’ is longer (figure A2) suggesting that maybe sovereign debt holding in GIIPS countries is mostly driven 
by moral suasion and not risk shifting. After 2013, when economic situation improved, CORE banks searched for 
yield increasing the exposure towards GIIPS government debt.  
72 Although the sample is smaller.  
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Our paper adds to the existing literature by focusing on bank balance sheet characteristics that 
can shape size and riskiness of sovereign bonds holding using a newly combined dataset of 
European banks across the period 2010-2015. Our main finding is that banks that are small, 
less capitalised, more profitable, more liquid, with high non-performing loans and limited 
lending hold more and riskier sovereign securities. While European and domestic sovereign 
exposure show similar results, different bank balance sheet features drive the exposure towards 
GIIPS and CORE countries. 
 
3. Methodology & Data 
 
3.1 Methodology 
To capture the effect of bank balance sheet characteristics on the size and riskiness of sovereign 
bonds holding we use the following econometric specifications:  
 
𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐵𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡       (1) 
 
𝑆𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐵𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡       (2) 
 
.Specifically, 𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 captures the size of sovereign exposure of bank i in country j at time 
t. It is calculated by dividing bank sovereign exposure by its assets. 𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡is split in 
different subcomponents:  𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 
𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 that refer to European, domestic, GIIPS and CORE country exposures, 
respectively. 𝑆𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a measure that indicates the riskiness of bank i in country j at time 
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t bonds holding portfolio73.The higher the value of 𝑆𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 the higher the risk of bonds 
portfolio. On the left hand side of the equation, we fit different balance sheet variables we 
reckon have an impact on the size and riskiness of sovereign exposure. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the bank total 
assets to GDP ratio (Barth et al. 2012). According to Demsetz and Strahan (1997), Saunders et 
al (1990), large banks are better able to diversify risks as they hold diversified portfolios. 
Hence, we expect size to be negatively related with both the size and riskiness of sovereigns 
held in the balance sheet. 𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡is the ratio of gross loans on total assets that we use to 
capture banks’ lending operations (Altavilla et al. 2016). During periods of economic distress, 
government bonds can act as substitutes for lending, so we expect a negative relationship 
between this variable and both the size and riskiness of sovereign bond portfolios. According 
to Gennaioli et al. (2014), sovereign debt has an important impact on bank liquidity positions. 
So, we include 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 , measured by the ratio of total loans to total deposits, to depict 
the ‘precautionary motive’ to hold government securities. Specifically, the loans to deposit 
ratio is a measure of maturity mismatch risk as it measures the coverage of long-term illiquid 
loans with stable short-term liquid funding. When maturity mismatch risk increases, banks can 
decide to reduce this by buying government bonds as they are easy to liquidate. We expect 
liquid banks to hold more sovereigns than illiquid banks. However, a positive relationship 
between bank liquidity and the riskiness of a sovereign bond portfolio is possible. Liquid banks 
can decide to employ their excessive liquidity to buy high-risk-high-yield government bonds 
as they have a ‘liquidity buffer’ to do so74. We introduce 𝐵𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡, computed as 
the interest income to operating income ratio, to capture heterogeneity in the income 
component among banks. Banks with different business models may have a different appetite 
for government debt (Buch et al. 2016). In-line with Acharya and Steffen (2015), we use the 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡) to see whether the preferred regulatory 
environment, that assigns zero-risk-weights to sovereigns in the Euro area, influences bonds 
                                                          
73 Computation of this variable is provided in appendix A1. 𝑆𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡  provides a risk-weighted measure of a 
bank bond portfolio. Banks with high exposure towards countries with high spread between the ten-year 
government bond and the German Bund (benchmark) have higher bond portfolio riskiness in comparison with 
those banks that hold bonds primarily in a country where the spread is thin. However, this does not mean that 
banks located in GIIPS countries have per se riskier bond portfolios. Capturing exposure towards each country in 
the sample, this measure takes each single exposure (weighted on bank total assets) toward a specific country and 
links it with the risk (the spread) of the same country. The sum of the single country exposure risk gives the overall 
bond portfolio riskiness. Hence, if a Portuguese bank is 50% exposed to Portuguese government bonds and 50% 
exposed to German bonds it has medium risk exposure, while a Danish bank holding 25% Danish, 25% Greek 
and 50% Spanish government bonds has a higher risk exposure.   
74 As during crisis periods government bonds can be subject to a ‘drying up’ of liquidity. Arguably, this effect is 
stronger for high credit risk government bonds. Hence, banks with excessive liquidity can bear the risk of holding 
risky sovereigns. 
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purchases. If this is the case, we expect weakly capitalised banks to hold more and riskier 
sovereign debt securities as they can use government bonds to replace loans in order to decrease 
risk-weighted-adjusted assets and boost the level of capital. 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡indicates the non-
performing loans to gross loans ratio (Affinito et al.2016). High non-performing loans worsen 
capital requirements and profitability. This in-turn can limit bank’s incentive to lend. For this 
reason, we expect a positive sign (for both risk and size) as banks can buy government debt 
securities to maintain profitability and capital ratios when credit quality is deteriorated. We use 
return on assets (Gennaioli et al. 2016; Affinito et al. 2016), calculated dividing bank’s net 
income by its assets, to capture overall bank profitability (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡)75. We expect 
a negative sign from this, both in term of size and riskiness, as less profitable banks may have 
an incentive to purchase high yielding government debt securities to increase earnings. We 
include 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡, that takes the value 1 during the SDC (2010-2012), 0 
otherwise, to control for any difference between the period during the SDC and after the crisis. 
We also use both time-invariant (𝜃𝑖) and year fixed effects (𝜇𝑗) to account for potential bank, 
country unobservable characteristics and macroeconomic factors and trends that can affect size 
and riskiness of bonds holding76.  
 
3.2 Data  
 
We build our dataset from various sources. Like Acharya and Steffen (2015), Horvath et al. 
(2015) Ongena et al. (2016), we also use both EU-wide stress test and EU-transparency 
exercise data provided by the European Banking Authority (EBA). Since 2010, the EBA has 
been responsible for stress tests and capitalisation exercises in the European banking sector. 
The EBA sample covers more than 60% of total assets in the EU (Acharya and Steffen, 2015). 
                                                          
75 We prefer return on assets rather than return on equity (RoE) as RoE is more volatile and easy to manipulate by 
managers via share buy-backs, provisioning and other earnings management techniques. However, RoE will be 
use as an additional test.  
76 Although several recent and important studies use banks’ balance sheet variables on the left and right side of 
the econometric equation (Jimenez et al. 2014) and others use a similar set-up to explain sovereign bonds holding 
(Buch et al. 2016; Affinito et al. 2016; Hildebrand et al. 2012; Gennaioli et al. 2016)  endogeneity is a concern. 
To get rid of the omitted variable bias we include bank and year fixed effects, which allows us to avoid the 
presence of unobservables correlated with the regressors. Following Affinito et al. 2016, we use the Hausman-
Durbin-Wu to test for endogeneity of all the regressors in the equation. Since, the dependent variable (𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
is divided by total assets as well as some of the independent variables (𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡  ;  𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡), we 
re-estimate the latter using interest earning assets. Finally, we use robust standard errors clustered at the bank 
level to control for heteroscedasticity and dependence (see Petersen, 2009; Donald and Lang, 2007).  
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Bank-level accounting data are taken from Bankscope (Orbis Bank Focus) (Gennaioli et al. 
2016) as well as from SNL Financial (Horvath et al. 2015)77. Our sample covers 51 banks from 
19 European countries (14 Eurozone and 4 non-Eurozone) over the period 2010-201578.  
Panel A and B of table 1 present summary statistics of the aforementioned balance sheet 
variables. Table 2 provides the correlation matrix among the variables used in our study. As 
shown, the determinants are not strongly correlated among each other’s79.  
 
4. Results 
 
The results from estimating equation 1 and 2 are presented in table 3. All the estimates include 
bank and year fixed effects. Column 1-4 report the estimates when we regress the size of 
sovereign bond holding on the determinants, split into European (column 1), domestic (column 
2), GIIPS (column 3) and CORE (column 4) holdings. Column 5 presents the results of the risk 
measure of bonds holding. As expected, the coefficient of SIZE is negatively related 
(statistically significant at conventional level) with both size and riskiness of bank sovereign 
exposure indicating that large banks tend to hold fewer and less risky government bonds 
(although for GIIPS and CORE countries the coefficients are not significant). This reflects a 
better diversified portfolio of large banks in comparison with small banks. Specifically, a one 
standard deviation change in bank size leads to a 3.7% change in European sovereign exposure, 
2.7% change in domestic exposure and 4.4% of bonds portfolio riskiness. Sovereign bonds 
appear also to be, during the sample period, a substitute for lending as suggested by the negative 
coefficient of LENDING. Banks that lend more display a smaller and less risky government 
bond portfolio. Although the effect is not significant for the exposure towards GIIPS and CORE 
countries, the economic significance of the coefficients is quite large. One standard deviation 
change in lending leads to a change of 3.7% in the European exposure, 3.9% in the domestic 
exposure and 10.6% in sovereign risk.  This is actually not surprising. In a period with slow 
economic recovery, high firm mortality rates as well as low interest rates banks might prefer 
                                                          
77 The decision to combine both databases is twofold. First, since the EBA sample of banks is small, we try to 
reduce as much as possible the number of missing values. Second, we double check for possible reporting mistakes 
in the databases.  
78 Contrary to the majority of the studies that focus around the crisis period, have an unbalanced panel dataset, we 
intentionally select banks that have been subject to EBA monitoring for each year (from 2010 to 2015). This 
decision allows us to have a balanced panel and consequently a better understanding of banks’ bond holding 
behaviour across all the sample period for the same banks.  
79 We also checked for multicollinearity among the variable using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). 
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to invest in safe assets such as government bonds rather than lending. Moreover, motivated by 
the preferred regulatory environment, they try to maintain profitability by investing in high 
yield bonds. As expected, the deposits to loans ratio (LIQUIDITY) is positively related to 
European and domestic sovereign exposure as well as to risk (the results does not hold well 
regarding GIIPS and CORE exposure). Liquid banks can have a ‘liquidity buffer’ that allows 
them to invest in high-yield-high-risk sovereigns. Economically, a one standard deviation 
change in the liquidity position of the bank leads to 1.4%, 2.2% and 5.3% change in European 
bond holdings, domestic holdings and risk exposure, respectively. Banks with a ‘non-interest 
income oriented’ business model display larger European, domestic and CORE exposures as 
shown by the positive sign of the coefficient (BUSINESS MODEL). However, the sign changes 
direction with reference to the riskiness of bond portfolios. Banks may decide to increase higher 
yield bond holdings if interest margins are under pressure80. The level of capital (CAPITAL) is 
negative related with European, domestic and CORE sovereign exposure. This result is in-line 
with the majority of the literature (Altavilla et al. 2016; Acharya and Steffen, 2015) suggesting 
that banks with low levels of capital have an incentive to buy government bonds due to  the 
favourable regulatory treatment. However, it is surprising to notice that less capitalised banks 
have an appetite for domestic and CORE sovereign debt but not for GIIPS as well as for riskier 
sovereigns (both statistically insignificant). Arguably, the SDC led to a different perception 
and definition of safe assets. Hence, banks perceive GIIPS sovereign debt as not as safe even 
under preferred regulatory treatment. The results on profitability show completely opposite 
results (PROFITABILITY). Profitable banks prefer GIIPS sovereign bonds as they carry high 
returns (search for yield) rather than CORE bonds. The effect on the overall European 
sovereign exposure appears to be driven by the former rather than the latter or/and domestic 
exposures. Non-performing loans (CREDIT QUALITY) enter in the regression with a positive 
sign and are mostly statistically significant. Again, the results seem to be stronger for GIIPS 
sovereign exposure (CORE coefficient is statistically insignificant). A twofold interpretation 
here is possible. First, banks with high non-performing loans are mostly located in GIIPS 
countries. Banks hold mostly domestic debt. This explains the positive relation both in term of 
size and risk. Second, banks with high non-performing loans ration lending and face 
profitability problems. Thus, the favourable regulatory treatment of sovereign bonds allows 
                                                          
80 Several recent studies (Borio et al.2015, Altavilla et al.2017, Claessens et al.2017, Molyneux et al. 2018 
underline the impact of low interest rates on the contraction of bank net interest margin and profitability. Hence, 
banks facing a contraction (mostly retail banks) can engage in ‘carry trade’ by exchanging low yield bonds to high 
yields that are riskier. 
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banks to increase the amount of GIIPS and risky sovereign debt in an attempt to regain 
profitability without any capital requirement. Finally, as expected, the dummy variable shows 
a negative coefficient suggesting the ‘flight to quality’ effect (mostly toward U.S Treasury 
bonds and German Bunds) that happened during the Greek meltdown.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Both the Great Recession and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis led to radical changes. Low 
and negative interest rate environment, high level of non-performing loans as well as weak 
economic prospects changed banks’ appetite toward sovereign bonds increasing their 
substitutability with lending. Balance sheet conditions appear to have a strong effect across the 
sample period with size, capitalisation, profitability, liquidity, credit quality and lending having 
a strong influence on both size and risk of bond portfolios. As the capitalisation result suggests, 
the favourable regulatory treatment applied to sovereigns (in Europe) has strongly contributed 
to this change as weakly capitalised banks might benefit from the regulation and increasing 
return on equity by shifting from low to high yielding sovereigns without altering regulatory 
capital requirements. However, as shown by our measure of risk, the SDC led to a different 
perception and definition of safe assets with weakly capitalised banks increasing just the 
amount of sovereign securities from stable (CORE) rather than peripheral countries (GIIPS).  
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Figure 1. Average European Sovereign Debt Exposure as % of Bank Total Assets over the 
Period 2010-2015. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary Descriptive Statistics 
           
Variable Obs Mean Std Min Man 
Panel A: Dependent Variable      
sovexpeur  272 9.30% 5.10% 2.40% 17.90% 
sovexpdom  272 6.64% 5.28% 1.14% 16.59% 
sovexpgiips 272 2.61% 3.65% 0.00% 10.57% 
sovexpcore 271 4.28% 4.62% 0.00% 13.25% 
sovrisk 276 0.2 0.15 0.02 0.51 
Panel B: Bank Balance Sheet Data      
size 273 37.28% 31.26% 0.23% 145.11% 
Lending 273 57.54% 15.58% 31.88% 79.25% 
liquidity 273 144.59% 50.56% 80.55% 248.23% 
Business Model 273 168.43% 180.63% 24.94% 1651.79% 
Capital 266 12.62% 2.83% 8.65% 17.83% 
Credit quality 252 6.85% 6.26% 0.38% 34.94% 
Profitability 273 0.16% 1.04% -6.79% 3.03% 
Note: sovexpeur is the ratio of European sovereign exposure on bank total assets, sovexpdom is the ratio of domestic sovereign 
exposure on bank total assets, sovexpgiips is the ratio of giips sovereign exposure on bank total assets, sovexpcore is the ratio 
of core sovereign exposure on bank total assets, sovrisk is calculated as explained in the appendix A1, size is the ratio of bank 
total on gdp, lending is the ratio of gross loans on bank total assets, liquidity is the ratio of loans on deposits, business model 
is the ratio of net interest income on operating income, capital is the common equity Tier1, credit quality is the ratio of non-
performing loans on gross loans, profitability is the ratio on net income on bank total assets.  
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Table 2. Covariance Matrix 
                          
variable sovexpeur sovexpdom sovexpgiips sovexpcore sovrisk size lending liquidity 
business 
model capital 
credit 
quality profitability 
sovexpeur 1            
sovexpdom 0.9985* 1           
sovexpgiips 0.9811* 0.9867* 1          
sovexpcore 0.9985* 0.9980* 0.9832* 1         
sovrisk 0.3348* 0.3315* 0.3012* 0.2998* 1        
size -0.2143* -0.2176* -0.1791* -0.1917* -0.4836* 1       
lending 0.2354* 0.2341* 0.2091* 0.2071* 0.2793* -0.1604* 1      
liquidity 0.3418* 0.3398* 0.2965* 0.3231* 0.0408 -0.1073 0.3734* 1     
business model -0.113 -0.109 -0.1064 -0.0991 0.0575 -0.1302* -0.1321* 0.1126 1    
capital 0.9045* 0.9034* 0.8957* 0.9601* 0.2975* -0.2050* 0.2358* 0.3471* -0.1216* 1   
credit quality 0.3615* 0.4123* 0.6265* -0.2617* 0.5115* -0.2499* 0.3175* -0.1241 -0.1131 -0.1582* 1  
profitability 0.1867* 0.1779* 0.1232* 0.1723* 0.0578 -0.1197* -0.0563 0.0775 -0.1189* 0.1958* -0.3463* 1 
* refers to 5% statistical significance level. 
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Table 3. Results: Size and Riskiness of Sovereign Bonds Holding. 
All regressions include bank and time fixed effects. Robust standard error clustered by banks in parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistically significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
  sovexpeur sovexpdom sovexpgiips sovexpcore sovrisk  
     
  
totass_gdp (SIZE) -0.1300*** -0.1070** -0.0374 -0.0405 -0.2120*  
 (0.0406) (0.0405) (0.0313) (0.0249) (0.1240) 
 
      
 
loan_totass (LENDING) -0.2440*** -0.2090** -0.1050 -0.0463 -0.6950**  
 (0.0803) (0.0864) (0.0817) (0.0447) (0.2950) 
 
      
 
loan_dep (LIQUIDITY) 0.0306** 0.0291** 0.0125 0.0128 0.1130**  
 (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0124) (0.0085) (0.0501) 
 
      
 
intinc_opeinc (BUSINESS 
MODEL) -0.0020* -0.0016* -0.0009 -0.0012* 0.0518* 
 
 (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0290) 
 
      
 
CET1 (CAPITAL RATIO) -0.0034*** -0.0016* -0.0011 -0.0014* -0.0050  
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0049) 
 
      
 
npls (CREDIT QUALITY) 0.0017** 0.0016* 0.00253*** 0.0004 0.0042*  
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0023) 
 
      
 
roa (PROFITABILITY) 0.0061** 0.0039 0.0075** 0.0007 0.0084  
 (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0012) (0.0126) 
 
      
 
debtcrisis -0.0276*** -0.0185*** -0.0094** -0.0156*** -0.5027*  
 (0.0059) (0.0053) (0.0044) (0.0054) (0.0251) 
 
      
 
Bank-Year Fe Y Y Y Y Y  
N 241 241 241 242 242  
r2 0.302 0.236 0.286 0.0891 0.236  
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Appendix A1 
 
𝑆𝑂𝑉𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 is computed in the following steps: 
1) Calculating the spread differences between country ten years yield government bonds 
and a benchmark (German bund): 
 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑡 = 1 + (𝑇𝑒𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗𝑡 − 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑡) 
 
2) Computing the sovereign exposure towards each country in the bank portfolio: 
 
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 
 
3) Calculating the sovereign bond portfolio riskiness 
 
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
18
1
 
 
Figure A1. GIIPS banks exposure towards domestic sovereigns.   
 
Figure A2. Non-GIIPS banks exposure towards GIIPS sovereigns.  
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CHAPTER 5: Should we winsorize data using difference-in-differences? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A substantial empirical banking and finance literature uses the difference-in-differences 
methodology and applies winsorized data to deal with outliers. However, many such studies 
ignore the fact that the practise of winsorizing data replaces outliers with values that are equal 
in both the treatment and control groups. To illustrate the severity of this issue, we randomly 
generate placebo interventions in bank-level data. We show that different winsorization 
techniques leads to large variability in estimated coefficients, as well as significance levels and 
standard errors. We also display how the problem can be limited and detected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Winsor, Difference-in-Differences, Outliers, Financial Data, Research Design 
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1. Introduction 
 
The practice of ‘winsorizing’ (or ‘winsorization’) has become a valid and popular tool among 
researchers to deal with outliers in a distribution of data81. This method, named after the 20th 
century biostatistician Charles Winsor, consists of replacing extreme value/s (or ‘outliers’) with 
the value of the highest data point not considered to be an outlier. Thus, winsorizing is the 
transformation, rather than the outright removal, of the data to limit the impact of outliers82. 
For example, an 80% winsorized mean averages the data below 10% and above 90% rather 
than eliminating them from the sample mean. The justification for this is to permit the inclusion 
of the data for significance tests and to maintain sample size. One caution related to winsorizing 
is that estimating and adding in values based on a percentage distribution simply reinforces the 
data set and alters legitimately occurring extreme observations that can contain important 
information (Leone et al 2014). However, other issues emerge in a difference-in-differences 
(DD) framework. The DD approach (see Card and Krueger 1994; Robert and Whited 2012) 
determines the difference in trends between two groups, a treatment (group affected) and a 
control (group not affected) after an intervention/shock. In the data set, values of the dependent 
variable lie on the same column for both the treatment and the control group. Hence, 
winsorising data replaces extreme values (different for the treatment and control group prior to 
winsorization) with values that are equal in both groups. Most studies appear to ignore this 
issue and subsequently present flawed findings.  The application of inappropriate winsorizing 
techniques can be detected by looking at maximum and minimum descriptive statistics values. 
Equal min and max values, in both the treatment and control group prior and after the 
intervention, are a sign of an incorrect use of winsorization83. Furthermore, DD winsorization 
papers tend to avoid detailed summary descriptive statistics in comparison with the DD non-
winsorizing raising additional concerns84. 
We use DD placebo interventions and bank level data to demonstrate the severity of this issue. 
We show that different winsorization approaches can lead to large variations in estimated 
                                                          
81 Using a sample of top finance journal papers (JF, JFE, RFS, JFQA) over the period 2008-2012, Adams et al. 
(2017) show that winsorizing covers 49% of the outlier mitigation methods.  
82 Trimming and dropping remove data completely from the sample.  
83 We will provide a more detailed explanation of problem detection in the following section. 
84 We notice that DD winsorization papers tend to display first and last percentiles in their descriptive statistics 
rather than minimum and maximum values. To gain further insight into this problem, we randomly selected 50 
DD winsorization and 50 winsorization-no-DD papers (from a total sample of 200 papers). We find that only 13 
DD –winsorization papers show minimum and maximum descriptive statistics compared to 37 studies that use the  
winsorization approach but not DD. These results are in-line with Adams et al. (2017) and Leone et al. (2015) 
who find that studies typically avoid mentioning outlier mitigation methods and related information.  
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coefficients, significance levels and standard errors. We contribute to the existing difference-
in-differences literature in several ways. First, we investigate issues relating to  an important 
estimation strategy in applied finance / economics (Bertrand et al., 2004; Donald and Lang, 
2007; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Second, we detect a problem that appears to be 
underestimated (or ignored) in the academic literature. Third, by using DD placebo regressions 
we provide incorrect measurement quantifications. Finally, we suggest ways in which the 
problem can be detected and solved for future researchers.  
 
The paper is divided as follow. Section 1 explains the problem and its detection. Section 2 
introduces our data and methodology. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Detecting the problem  
 
We use a stylised normal density function to show the erroneous application of the 
winsorization approach for dealing with outliers in a DD framework. Figure 1 shows two data 
distributions divided between the control (0 on top of the figure) and the treatment (1 on top of 
the figure). In the treatment group we arbitrarily introduce an outlier that makes the distribution 
skewed to the left. This gives the researcher a justification for winsorizing85. We apply two 
strategies: normal winsorization and winsorization by group. Figure 2 displays what happens 
when winsorization is enforced without distinguishing between the two groups. As shown 
winsorizing replaces the outlier with the smallest value in the two groups (zero in this case). 
However, zero is a value that does not belong to the treatment groups but rather to the control. 
Furthermore, zero appears to be an outlier even after winsorization. For the aforementioned 
issues, Winsor by group (Figure 3) is the appropriate solution as it treats outliers separately. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Normal density function (no-winsorizing) 
                                                          
85 Examining the most suitable technique (winsorizing, trimming or dropping for example) in this circumstance 
is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Figure 2. Normal Density Function (winsorizing)  
 
Figure 3. Normal Density Function (Winsor by group) 
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Picture 1, taken from Organization Science, shows how the winsorization problem can be 
detected when authors provide descriptive statistics divided by treatment and control group. In 
the paper, the authors state that the variable Daily efficiency has been winsorized at 2 standard 
deviation from the mean. As shown in the picture, Min and Max display equal values in both 
treatment and control group. This is a sign that winsorization has been applied without 
differentiating between the two groups. Since Daily efficiency is one of the dependent variables 
in the study, this can lead to serious estimation problems as further examined. 
 
Picture 1. Winsor Problem Detection in Min and Max Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
 
To illustrate the effect of different Winsor techniques, we randomly generate placebo 
interventions and random samples using industrialised countries bank-level data. The DD 
framework is specified as follow:  
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𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (1) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, equity to total assets (E/TA)
86, of bank i at time t. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if bank 𝑖 has been affected by the intervention/shock 
and 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after the intervention/shock 
and 0 before that period87, and 𝛽3 represents the average difference in the dependent variable 
between banks in the treatment and control group prior to and after the intervention/shock. As 
widely used in the empirical banking and finance literature, we include 𝛾𝑖 and 𝜑𝑡  to capture, 
respectively, bank and year fixed effects as well as to limit the potential for bias in estimates 
of 𝛽388.  
We then estimate equation (1) using three different methods. In the first, we do not apply 
winsorization leaving outliers unchanged. In the second, we apply winsorization 
indiscriminately on both treated and untreated groups (approach that is technically incorrect). 
In the third, we winsorize for both treated and untreated bank samples. In-line with the literature 
we winsorize the treatment variable at 1% and 99%89. 
 
3.2 Data  
Our sample covers 16,675 financial institutions over the period 2008-2016. Bank balance sheet 
data are from Orbis Bank Focus. The period is split in two subsamples. In the first subsample 
(2012-2016) we set the intervention in 2014 and we use it to explain the main results. In the 
second subsample (2008-2012) we set the intervention in 2010 and it will be used as a 
robustness to confirm our results. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the aforementioned winsorization techniques. E/TA 
no-winsorization presents the largest standard deviation in both groups due to the number of 
                                                          
86 We will use the ratio of equity on total assets as an example. However, later in the paper, we will check the 
robustness of the results using different bank ratios (net interest income on average earning, securities on total 
assets, non-interest income on gross revenues, liquid assets on deposit and short-term borrowing and deposits on 
total liabilities) and intervention windows. The decision to use these variables is not casual. We have taken those 
variables showing a substantial number of outliers in the dataset.   
87 In this case, the dummy variable takes value 1 after 2014 and 0 otherwise (sample period 2012-2016). We use 
a different sample (2008-2012 with intervention set in 2010) to show the validity of our result 
88 Standard errors are also robust and are clustered at the bank level. 
89 Studies use different winsorization levels such as 10% and 90% or 5% and 95%. However, 1% and 99% level 
is the most commonly used in the empirical finance literature. On 50 papers we examine 39 use the 1% and 99% 
winsorization level. 
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outliers in the sample. As shown in the previous section, E/TA winsorization displays equal 
minimum and maximum values and a smaller standard deviation similar in both groups. 
Finally, when winsorization is applied by group (E/TA winsorization by group) the minimum 
and maximum values differ and standard deviation falls in-line with E/TA no-winsorization. 
As shown in the table, E/TA winsorization presents two problems. The first concern regards 
mean values. Winsorized outliers, replaced with equal values in the treatment and control 
group, move up and down the mean of the treatment and control group, respectively, in 
comparison to E/TA winsorization by group and E/TA no winsorization. Second, the standard 
deviation shows smaller variation across the two groups making them more homogenous.  
  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics control and treatment group (2012-2016) 
            
  Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Treatment      
E/TA no Winsorization 17182 12.94 18.45 -967.21 100 
E/TA Winsorization 17182 14.03 8.51 4.52 30.95 
E/TA Winsorization by 
group 17182 10.14 5.15 4.07 21.76 
Control      
E/TA no Winsorization 9654 18.55 29.66 -969.91 100 
E/TA Winsorization 9654 10.96 7.07 4.52 30.95 
E/TA Winsorization by 
group 9654 16.55 13.91 5.47 51.27 
 
4. Results  
Table 2 shows the results derived from estimates of the placebo tests using the three different 
winsorization approaches. All regressions are estimated using bank and year fixed effects. The 
first column of table 1 shows the result without winsorization. The coefficient of interest, 
Treatment (E/TA), is statistically insignificant displaying also large standard error. Similar 
results are found when winsorization is applied separately between treatment and control 
groups (column 3). However, the results completely change when winsorization is applied 
without distinguishing between the groups (column 2). The coefficient acquires significance 
(statically significant at the 1% level) and standard error is smaller. Hence, while the results 
without winsorization and with winsorization by group suggest no change in the dependent 
variable between the control and the treatment group prior to and after the intervention/shock, 
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the winsorized coefficient shows a positive and statistically significant change in E/TA in 
treated banks after the intervention. Thus, providing misleading results - in this case on  bank 
solvency. 
 
Table 2. Winsorization Techniques and DD methodology.   
        
  
No-
Winsorization 
(1) 
Winsorization 
(2) 
Winsorization by Groups 
(3) 
treated -5.670*** -3.085*** -6.626*** 
 (0.606) (0.196) (0.279) 
period 0.385 0.203*** 0.252** 
 (0.353) (0.0620) (0.0989) 
Treatment (E/TA) 0.129 0.190*** 0.147 
 (0.365) (0.0719) (0.103) 
    
Number of banks 7467 7467 7467 
Number of Observations 26836 26836 26836 
 
To make sure the result is not affected by specific sample selection, we test the latter on 
multiple random samples and different intervention windows. Table 3 shows the rejection rate 
of the three different winsorization techniques for two different intervention windows (2008-
2012, 2012-2016), 106 random samples90and 6 accounting variables91. When winsorization is 
applied on both groups the rejection rate, namely, rejecting the null hypothesis that 𝛽3 is equal 
to zero in favour of the alternative that 𝛽3 differs from zero, is the highest supporting the 
validity of our previous findings.92. 
Table 3. Rejection Rate Winsor Techniques 
                                                          
90 Random samples are defined as drawing observation without replacement.  
91 The variables have already been defined (see section 3.1).  
92 We consider as rejected under a 10% p-value significant level. 
 
           
Placebo 
windows 
N. 
Samples N.Variables  
No-winsorization 
Rejection Rate (1) 
Winsorization 
Rejection Rate 
(2) 
Winsorization by 
Groups Rejection Rate 
(3) 
      
2012-2016 57 6 21% 75% 36% 
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5. Conclusion 
Most studies in the banking and finance literature using difference-in-differences methodology 
apply winsorized data to deal with outliers. However, some studies ignore the fact that the 
practise of winsorizing data replaces outliers with values that are equal in both the treatment 
and control group. In this paper, we have highlighted the problem of an incorrect application 
of winsorization, how this can be detected and how it results in biased  estimates. Hence, the 
appropriate way to apply winsorization in a DD  setting is to do this separately  for treated and 
untreated  groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
2008-2012 49 6 18% 69% 37% 
 53 6 20% 72% 37% 
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